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ABSTRACT 
In the current literature, there are seemingly incompatible predictions about the 
benefits and costs of internationalization for family firms.  On the one hand, the 
behavioral agency model suggests that to preserve socio-emotional wealth, loss-averse 
family firms usually invest less internationally than nonfamily firms. In contrast, other 
scholars believe that international diversification has become a key way to protect family 
wealth. To reconcile the conflicting conclusions, I propose that whether family firms are 
able to achieve the economic benefits from internationalization as well as preserve their 
family identity is partly dependent on the how, when and where the family firms enter 
international markets.  
From these theoretical underpinnings, a model is developed proposing that the 
mode of entry choice may mitigate the risk of loss of family identity. Specifically, 
family firms are more likely to choose Greenfield investment as their mode of entry to a 
foreign country.  In addition, three formal institutional distances--economic, regulatory, 
and political—may create extra costs if family firms choose Greenfield investment as 
their entry mode. 
I compiled the dataset of 2,595 family firms from 70 countries that invested in 
38,014 subsidiaries from 89 countries between the years 2007-2013. The results show 
that family firms are more likely to use Greenfield investment as their entry mode when 
they try to protect their family identity and use M&A investment when they care more 
iii 
about their economic identity. The institutional distance significantly moderates these 
two main relationships. 
Through this dissertation, I hope to make a number of contributions to the 
literatures of organizational identity, family firm, and institutional theory. First, in this 
study, I focus on the family firm internationalization strategy, and determine under what 
circumstances the two dominant identities (economic identity and family identity) of a 
family firm converge and under which they diverge when the reference points are 
changed. Second, this study contributes to the current institutional distance-mode of 
entry research by introducing additional dimensions of institutional distance.  Third, I 
investigate the interactive effects between identities and institutional distance on mode 
of entry choice by introducing the institutional polycentricity concept in the theoretical 
framework.
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INTRODUCTION  
The concept of organizational identity focuses on two questions: “who we are” as 
an organization and “who are they.” “Who we are” depends on the assumptions about 
how to understand the identity as an organization.  Similarly, “who are they” is a 
question asked by internal and external stakeholders, such as alumni (Mael & Ashforth, 
1992), employees (Elsbach & Glynn, 1996), and boards of directors (Golden-Biddle & 
Rao, 1997), trying to understand the identity of organized group.  The organizational 
identity determines a firm’s vision and mission (Dutton & Dukerich, 1991), strategies 
(Dutton & Dukerich, 1991; Dutton, Dukerich, & Harquail, 1994; Dutton & Penner, 
1993), resource allocation process, and motivation (Whetten & Godfrey, 1998).   
Applying organizational identity to the family firm, current research suggests two 
major identities for family firms: economic identity and family identity (Gomez-Mejia, 
et al., 2011; Stewart & Hitt, 2012)1.  On one hand, as an economic entity similar to non-
family firms, profitability is an important motivation for family firms to maintain 
ownership of their operation.  However, as Sirmon and Hitt (2003) observed, family 
firms are different from nonfamily firms across many dimensions, such as their 
recruitment of family members for key positions, their embeddedness in social networks, 
their long-term investment planning, their sustainable support (from family) during poor 
economic times, and sometimes their  lack of professional management (Stewart & Hitt, 
2012). Therefore, Gomez-Mejia et al. (2007) hypothesized that for family firms, the 
                                                 
1 The family firms discussed in this study are the majority of family firms which consider family identity as one of 
their critical identities. 
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primary reference point is the loss of socio-emotional wealth (SEW). In their words, “for 
family firms a key criterion, or at least one that has greater priority, is whether their 
socio-emotional endowment will be preserved… for nonfamily firms, financial criteria 
seem to be most important when it comes to assessing the value of a business decision, 
as they are less driven by the need to protect their socio-emotional endowment” (2007: 
131).  Therefore, the preservation of SEW engenders a strong sense of shared family 
identity (Berrone, et al., 2010).  However, the emphasis on family identity instead of 
economic identity creates the possibility of identity conflicts in family firms because “it 
is possible that a family firm owner could regard the family as being more salient than 
the business and could thus overemphasize relationship concerns at the expense of 
business concerns” (Barnett, Eddleston & Kellermanns, 2009: 42). 
The possibility of identity conflict between economic identity and family identity 
caused by non-financial goals in family firms (Corbetta & Salvato, 2004) is higher when 
the family owners make a decision to internationalize.  Internationalization presents an 
opportunity for family firms to diversify their operations geographically (Anderson & 
Reeb, 2003; Denis, Denis, & Sarin, 1994; Faccio, Lang, & Young, 2001, Hitt, 
Hoskisson, & Kim, 1997).  This opportunity to potentially mitigate family risk provides 
two economic benefits to the family firm: it decreases the volatility of earnings as well 
as provides greater financial security to the family (Faccio et al., 2001); therefore it 
potentially improves the chances of firm survival.  The financial benefits derived from 
internationalization are especially important to the family firms because family firms are 
normally financially constrained because they are reluctant to raise financial capital from 
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the external capital markets since an increase in share capital will dilute their equity 
stake and undermine their controlling position eventually (Shleifer & Vishny, 1986). 
With these financial benefits, the economic identity of family firm could be satisfactorily 
served.  However, operating in a foreign environment also bears potential risk.  Prior 
research has suggested that when multinational enterprises (MNEs) operate within 
multiple countries, they experience liabilities of foreignness (i.e., costs of doing business 
abroad relative to the local operations) (Eden & Miller, 2004).  In sum, there is a trade-
off between benefits and costs of internationalization when it is considered from the 
economic perspective. 
Interestingly, we also cannot develop an absolute conclusion regarding the 
relationship between family identity and internationalization.  On the one hand, the 
behavioral agency model suggests that to preserve socio-emotional wealth, loss-averse 
family firms usually invest less internationally than nonfamily firms (Gomez-Mejia, 
Makri & Kintana, 2009).  Effective foreign operations generally require hiring personnel 
from outside the company with sufficient and proven talent, professional abilities and 
competencies to staff key executive positions.  Family members are often reluctant to 
allow non-family members to fill top management positions because this might dilute 
family identity in the firm.  According to Gomez-Mejia et al (2009), the pursuit of 
internationalization entails greater uncertainty and more delegation, both of which can 
reduce family control which may lead to real or perceived socio-emotional wealth.  So, 
the potential downside of internationalization is the loss of family identity.  
Comparatively, Kachaner, Stalk, and Bloch (2012) argue that family-controlled firms 
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have been ambitious about their overseas expansion. “They generate more sales abroad 
than other businesses do; on average 49% of their revenues come from outside their 
home region, versus 45% of revenues at nonfamily businesses” (Kachaner et al., 2012: 
105).  The rationale is that international diversification has become a crucial way to 
protect family wealth.  If one subsidiary suffers a downturn, businesses in other 
countries can generate funds that allow a company to balance the loss of that subsidiary 
(Table 1).  In this way, the family identity is preserved. 
In this study, I try to reconcile these seemingly incompatible predictions by 
integrating insights from organizational identity theory, institutional theory, and mode of 
entry research.  I propose that whether family firms are able to achieve the economic 
benefits from internationalization as well as preserve their family identity is partly 
dependent on the how, when and where the family firms enter international markets.   
The first issue is “how.” Some studies argue that a MNE may prefer acquiring 
local firms to compensate for its lack of knowledge in an unfamiliar environment, 
relying on local employees to contribute local knowledge (Gatignon & Anderson, 1988; 
Shenkar, 2001).  By co-managing the venture with local employees, the MNE can better 
manage the subsidiaries, learning from their local employees.  Furthermore, the local 
employees can manage the labor force and continue their relationship with suppliers, 
customers, and government authorities (Stopford & Wells, 1972). In this way, MNEs 
realize their economic goals.  However, Greenfield investment provides some 
advantages over acquisition.  For example, it is easier to maintain absolute control.  This 
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is especially meaningful for family firms because by using Greenfield investment as 
their mode of entry, family identity is more likely to be preserved.   
The choice between acquisition and Greenfield investment can be explained by 
the behavioral agency model (Wiseman & Gomez-Mejia, 1998; Gomez-Mejia, 
Welbourne & Wiseman, 2000; Larraza-Kintana et al., 2007).   Behavioral agency model 
predicts that decision makers try to avoid the loss compared to their reference point.  In 
order to avoid the loss, they even are willing to accept a higher risk (Wiseman & 
Gomez-Mejia, 1998; Gomez-Mejia, Welbourne & Wiseman, 2000). Thus, to protect the 
family identity, family owners are more amenable to accept economic risk.  Therefore, 
family firms are more likely to choose Greenfield investment as their mode of entry to a 
foreign country. 
The second issue is “when.”  When family firms emphasize their family identity, 
the choice of Greenfield investment as the mode of entry will significantly increase the 
family control and preserve the family identity.  On the contrary, if the family firms have 
a major concern for their economic identity, it is more likely that they will choose 
acquisition to enter into a foreign country.   
The third issue is “where.”  Institutional distance plays an important role in 
answering this question.  Institutional theory suggests that the institutional environment 
is an influential determinant of firm structure and strategies (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983, 
1991; Scott, 1995). For example, formal institutions represent laws, regulations, and 
rules that governments use to control the activities and behaviors of local and foreign 
organizations operating within a country.  Specifically, three formal institutions--
 6 
 
economic, regulatory, and political--were identified in previous literature as three highly 
important national formal institutions (Holmes, Miller, Hitt, & Salmador, 2013).  
Economic institutions mainly determine a country’s capital availability and market 
liquidity. Regulatory institutions are used by governmental entities to regulate the 
activities of domestic and foreign organizations operating within a country.  Political 
institutions are rules and standards established by governments that define the nature of 
the political process (Hillman & Keim, 1995).  Economic, regulatory, and political 
institutions shape firms’ strategic choices, such as mode of entry in their 
internationalization process. 
Institutional distance between home and host countries creates extra costs for 
MNEs because of the complexity and challenges of having operations within multiple 
institutional environments. Institutional distance refers to “the extent of dissimilarity 
between host and home institutions” (Xu & Shenkar, 2002: 610), and has been regarded 
as one of the main sources of liability of foreignness related to MNEs’ FDI strategies 
(Zaheer, 1995). Many scholars have discussed how MNEs could mitigate the liability of 
foreignness by choosing from different types of entry mode.  The main conclusion is that 
when the institutional distance between home and host country is higher, MNEs will 
choose high equity involvement (Gatignon & Anderson, 1988; Gaur et al., 2007).  It is 
difficult for MNEs to manage their foreign affiliates when institutional distance is high, 
so MNEs prefer high control as a way to reduce dependence on local partners.  Hence, 
previous literature suggests a positive relationship between institutional distance and 
equity investment (Gatignon & Anderson, 1988; Gaur et al., 2007).  But all the studies 
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have been focused on one identity: firms’ economic identity. The family firm focus 
provides us an interesting research setting to examine how institutional distance will 
influence family firms’ international strategies when they present two identities: family 
identity and economic identity.  This study extends the current institutional distance-
mode of entry research in three ways.  First, I study the relationship between different 
types of institutional distance (economic, regulatory, and political) and 
Greenfield/acquisition choice.  It is well acknowledged that the low institutional distance 
will lead to acquisition (Xu & Shenkar, 2002).  But economic, regulatory, and political 
institutions influence the mode of entry choice in different ways.  More developed 
economic institutions influence the availability and accessibility of the country’s 
financial resources and reduce transaction costs; more favorable regulatory institutions2 
ensure stability and order in societies and enact policies that facilitate economic growth;  
the democratic political institutions is an indicator of credibility of the government.  
When economic, regulatory, and political institutional distances are low, firms are 
operating in a similar institutional environment, resulting in a situation in which 
acquisitions are commonly used as the preferred entry mode. 
Second, although previous research has examined the impact of institutional 
distance on a MNE’s mode of entry, that work has treated institutional distance as 
symmetric measure like geographic distance.  However, the institutional distance is 
                                                 
2 Favorable institutions refer to the institutions that provide firms with the material and immaterial resources when 
there exists the resource unavailability or opportunity costs in the markets (Carney, 2012).  Commonly recognized 
favorable institutions include economic institutions that provide equity, debt, and qualified labor, regulatory 
institutions which provide regulated and social orders for firms’ operation, and democratic political institutions. 
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actually asymmetric between two countries.  For example, unlike their counterparts from 
developed countries, MNEs from emerging markets face greater challenges in obtaining 
legitimacy when entering the developed markets.  Therefore, when a MNE from an 
emerging market invests in developed markets, it will perceive a smaller institutional 
distance than a MNE from developed country investing in emerging markets because of 
the favorable institutional environment in the developed country.  Thus, it is more likely 
to choose acquisition over Greenfield as its mode of entry. 
Third, the dominant role of family identity in family firms also influences the 
relationship between institutional distance and entry mode choices.  When institutional 
distance is low, the utilization of Greenfield investment enables family firms to achieve 
economic benefits as well as preserve their SEW and specifically family identity.  
However, when institutional distance is high, family firms will prefer acquisition over 
Greenfield investment as their mode of entry in order to mitigate liability of foreignness. 
The research questions of this study include:  
In order to preserve economic identity, what mode of entry are family firms more 
likely to use to enter international markets? 
In order to preserve family identity, what mode of entry are family firms more 
likely to use to enter international markets? 
How does the economic and family identity conflict influence the mode of entry 
choice? 
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How do local institutional environments, including such variables as institutional 
type and institutional distance, influence the relationship between family identity and 
mode of entry choice in family firms when they enter into international markets? 
How does the interactive effect of internal identity conflict and external 
institutional environments affect mode of entry choice in the family firm international 
strategy? 
This study has potential to contribute to the organizational identity theory, 
institutional theory, mode of entry, and socioemotional wealth research in several ways. 
First, previous organizational identity theory discussed the conflict or reinforcement of 
identities when organizations possess multiple identities. Existing family firm literature 
treats family identity and economic identity as two conflicting objectives.  Scholars 
argue that the emphasis of one identity leads to ignoring another identity (Gomez-Mejia, 
et al., 2007).  In this study, I focus on the family firm internationalization strategy and 
use socioemotional wealth and financial performance as the proxies of family and 
economic identities, and determine under what circumstances the two dominant 
identities (economic identity and family identity) of a family firm converge and under 
which they diverge when the reference points are changed.   With external environment 
change, such as operation in a foreign country, if institutional distance is low, the use of 
a Greenfield investment realizes the convergence of family and economic identity. 
Second, this study contributes to the current institutional distance-mode of entry 
research by introducing more dimensions of institutions.  The constructs of institutional 
type, institutional distance, and the direction of institutional distance is used to 
 10 
 
differentiate the country institutional systems. Although previous research has examined 
the impact of various institutional distance on a MNE’s mode of entry, that work has 
only considered institutional distances as absolute values. In this study, I examine how 
the direction of various institutional distance impacts mode of entry choice.  In 
particular, I compare how more favorable/less favorable host country economic, 
regulatory, and political institutions determine mode of entry choices.   
Third, I investigate the interactive effects between identities and institutional 
distance on mode of entry choice by introducing the institutional polycentricity concept 
in the theoretical framework.  Previous literature has discussed the institutional 
polycentricity by integrating the different country level institutions (Batjargal, et al., 
2013).  In this study, I extend the current institutional polycentricity literature by 
examining the interaction of the country level and organizational level institutions 
(Hughes, 1939; Selznick, 1949).  The organizational identities, such as family identity 
and economic identity, create “rules of games” inside the organizations.  The identity 
consistency among the parent family firms and their subsidiaries creates internal 
legitimacy for the subsidiaries.  The country level institutions, on the other hand, 
determine the external legitimacy of the subsidiaries.  The organization level and country 
level institutions interactively affect the mode of entry choice. 
Specifically, I discuss under what institutional circumstance, the economic 
identity and family identity converge or diverge in terms of mode of entry choice.   If 
under certain institutional conditions the economic identity and family identity suggest 
the same mode of entry (the convergence situation), how do these two identities increase 
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the likelihood of choosing certain types of mode of entry? If under certain institutional 
conditions the economic identity and family identity each suggest a different mode of 
entry (the divergence situation), how does the family firm balance its identity conflict 
and which identity will be considered as dominant identity?  Based on behavioral agency 
model, a Pareto improvement concept is used to study the possibility of preserving 
family and economic identities simultaneously when family firms choose their mode of 
entry under certain institutional conditions. If a family firm could significantly 
strengthen one identity without greatly damaging another identity when it chooses a 
certain entry mode, then there is possibility of Pareto improvement.  On the contrary, if a 
family firm can only strengthen one identity and damage another identity when it 
chooses a certain entry mode, then it achieves Pareto efficiency and no Pareto 
improvement exists. 
The dissertation proceeds as follows. In the next section, I discuss organizational 
identity theory to explain how conflict between economic identity and family identity 
influences mode of entry choice. The following section introduces different types of 
institutional distance, the direction institutional distance, and reviews of research 
concerned with mode of entry, with a particular emphasis on acquisition/Greenfield 
choice. I then develop hypotheses for the set of relationships illustrated in Figure 1. 
Following the development of the hypotheses, I describe the methodology used to test 
the hypotheses. Results follow the methodology section, and then I provide a discussion 
of the results regarding their support for theory, their relationship with past research, 
limitations, and prospects for future research. 
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THEORETICAL DEVELOPMENT 
Organizational Identity 
Albert and Whetten (1985: 264) characterized organizational identity as “a self 
reflective question.”  It captures an organization’s essential features.  Albert and 
Whetten summarized these features into three major dimensions: Organizational identity 
help organizations answer three questions: (a) what is considered to be central to the 
organization by the organization members; (b) how the organization distinctive from 
other organizations; and (c) what is the enduring or continuing organization feature in 
the present the past.  Importantly, organizational identity is a self-referential concept 
defined by the members of an organization to articulate who they are as an organization 
to themselves as well as external stakeholders. 
However, the three major dimensions have been challenged and questioned by 
many scholars.  Regarding to centrality, Corley et al. (2006: 90) indicated that the notion 
“can be problematic, not because there is any question about whether or not an 
organization can have characteristics that are central, but because it is so difficult to 
define what makes a characteristic central.”  Corley et al. (2006) also argued the 
criterion of distinctiveness has rarely been demonstrated.  The debate on the enduring 
nature of organizational identity has attracted more attention than centrality and 
distinctiveness dimensions in the last two decades (Chreim, 2005; Corley, 2004; Fiol, 
1991, 2002; Gioia & Thomas, 1996; Gioia, Schultz, & Corley, 2000; Hatch & Schultz, 
2002; Ravasi & Schultz, 2006; Ybema et al., 2009). The debate on the enduring nature 
of organizational identity is explained in the later part of this chapter. 
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Further, regarding the self-referential nature of the organizational identity 
definition, there are three different theoretical perspectives: a functionalist perspective, 
an interpretive perspective, and a postmodern perspective.  
Organizational Identity and Firm Decision-Making 
Organizational identity influences firm strategy and decision-making in several 
ways. First, as suggested by Albert and Whetten (1985), identity describes the essence of 
an organization.  Thus, identity becomes a major symbol in which firms and other 
organizations define or signal themselves to customers, employees, suppliers, and 
investors, and also the way customers, employees, and other constituencies recognize the 
image of these organizations (Dutton & Dukerich, 1991).  An identity that creates a 
central, distinctive, and enduring identity in the minds of internal and external 
stakeholders can have significant and positive reputational effects and be a source of 
legitimacy.  
Second, the central, distinctive, and enduring identity helps top managers focus 
their attention on the most significant or important strategic issues.  Studies by Dutton 
and her colleagues (Dutton & Dukerich, 1991; Dutton, Dukerich, & Harquail, 1994; 
Dutton & Penner, 1993) have shown that organizational identity influences which 
environmental stimuli are noticed and which environmental stimuli are ignored.  Identity 
can also play an important role in influencing organizational priority.  It is not that 
managers purposefully ignore less central competitors and issues, but identity requires 
managers to focus their attention on a much more limited set of direct competitors and 
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the most relevant strategic issues.  This request to focus management attention may be 
important or even essential to affect organizations’ strategic choices. 
Third, the central, distinctive, and enduring identity has a major influence on the 
allocation of resources within organizations; and, understanding identity can become 
tightly coupled with these allocation processes, standard operating procedures, and fixed 
assets purchase.  If the firm manages to develope these processes and skills of resource 
allocation, it further reinforces its identity.  Together, organizational identity and the 
associated resource allocation can form what Mintzberg (1979) has called an 
organizational “gestalt.”  Such a gestalt not only places a firm in a unique identification 
vis-à-vis its rivals in the competitive environment, it also provides that firm with a set of 
organizational competencies that reinforces its identity.  
Identity Change and Identity Conflict 
There is a debate considering the organizational identity change.  Beginning with 
Albert and Whetten (1985), the deterministic perspective suggests that organizational 
identity is stable and durable over long period of time.  The inertial nature of 
organizational identity suggests that, over time, many aspects of a particular firm’s 
identity are likely to become obsolete and less competitively relevant.  A growing body 
of evidence also reveals that most firms find it almost impossible to change in ways that 
are inconsistent with their identities.  Changing identity involves much more than 
economic costs; indeed, the costs of changing identity are largely psychological and 
social rather than economic (Albert & Whetten, 1985).   
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However, the human agency perspective suggests that organizational identity 
changes or is capable of being changed in shorter durations of time. One factor that can 
accelerate organizational identity change is organizational environmental changes.  In a 
relatively stable environment, organizational identity is more likely to be a component of 
competitive advantage because members strongly agree on the identity, they believe it is 
the right identity, the identity is simple and unified, the identity is concrete, and content 
fits with the environment.  On the contrary, in an environment that is changing in ways 
that requires new strategies from the firm, identity is less likely to be a source of 
competitive advantage. When members disagree about identity, they are not sure what 
the identity is, they are not sure it is right, or even think it is wrong, especially when the 
identity has many aspects, or there are multiple identities, and ambiguous terms allow 
for multiple interpretations. New contextual and competitive features appear and 
supplant old ones, products and services undergo extraordinarily rapid change, and so 
on.  All of these have an immediacy of impact that requires rapid reconstruction of 
identity so that the organization can maintain flexibility.   
Besides the changing of organizational identity, organizations can be viewed as 
having multiple identities, each of which may be a dominant identity for a given context 
or a certain type of stakeholders.  Organizations present a complicated and multifaceted 
identity, each component of the identity is relevant to specific context, functions, or 
external stakeholders, without appearing fragmented or contradictory.  Organizations 
develop and manifest different identity components according to core values, practices, 
and products and services.  Using the concept of life-cycle of organizational identity, 
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Albert and Whetten (1985) suggested that over the course of the organization’s life, 
identity shifts by both “substitution” (one identity giving way to anther) and “addition” 
(one identity joining another-leading to dual or multiple identities).  In terms of 
substitution, organizational identity change is a punctuated equilibrium (Gersick, 1991; 
Romanelli & Tushman, 1994) and identity change may lead to loss of legitimacy caused 
by identity ambiguity.   For the addition of identity, the new identity is added to the old 
identity.  For example, in the initial phases of a profit-seeking firm, it is very economic 
value-oriented; survival is its primary goal, so the economic identity is its dominant 
identity.  In the later phases, normative identity (social values-oriented) is added to the 
economic identity.  This phenomenon has especially meaningful applications in family 
firms. In the early phase of a family firm, financial goals are primary because of the high 
failure rate of new ventures. Therefore, economic identity is its dominant identity.  With 
the development of the family firm, the survival is no longer the primary concern, the 
family identity is added to the economic identity.  For example, the family firm will pay 
more attention to some non-financial goals, such as the preservation of socioemotional 
wealth.  
Family Firm 
A family firm has been defined in many different ways, each focusing on some 
combination of a family’s control in the different business components, such as 
ownership, governance, management, and transgenerational succession (Chua, 
Chrisman, Sharma, 1999). Chrisman, Chua, and Sharma (2005) pointed out that 
“researchers have had problems making these components precise and it is not readily 
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apparent how they could or should be reconciled.”  In this study, I follow the definition 
of Chrisman, Chua, and Sharma (2005).  They identify a firm as a family firm when a 
family has influence over the strategic direction of a firm (Davis & Tagiuri, 1989); when 
the family intends to maintain control in the firm; when the firm emphasizes family 
interests over economic interests (Chua et al., 1999); and when the firm obtains unique, 
valuable, synergistic resources and capabilities from family members and interactions 
(Habbershon, Williams, & MacMillan, 2003).   
The family business literature has stressed that the key distinguishing feature that 
separates family firms from non-family business is the presence (sometimes even the 
dominance) of noneconomic factors in the decision making process (Gomez-Mejia, 
Cruz, Berrone, & De Castro, 2011). In family firms, because family and business 
systems are intrinsically linked, boundaries between the family and the business are 
blurred. Consequently, elements such as emotions, idiosyncratic family values, and an 
altruistic orientation tend to permeate at all levels of the organization and they build up 
to an “affective endowment” that family firms cherish and strive to preserve.  
Socioemotional Wealth and Behavioral Model 
This interrelated nature of family firms and the consequential utilities family 
owners derive from the noneconomic aspects of owning and operating a business have 
been labeled as “socioemotional wealth” (Berrone, Cruz, Gomez-Mejia, & Larraza-
Kintana, 2010; Berrone, Cruz, & Gomez Mejia, 2012; Gomez-Mejia, Haynes, Nuñez-
Nickel, Jacobson, & Moyano-Fuentes, 2007; Gomez Mejia et al., 2011).  The 
socioemotional wealth of family firms include the ability to exercise authority in the 
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firms (Schulze, Lubatkin, & Dino, 2003), the emphasis on belonging, affect, and 
intimacy (Kepner, 1983), the importance of family values through the business (Handler, 
1990), the establishment of the family dynasty (Casson, 1999), the building and 
development of the family firm’s social capital (Arregle, Hitt, Sirmon, & Very, 2007), 
the fulfillment of family obligations (Athanassiou, Crittenden, Kelly, & Marquez, 2002), 
and the altruism to family members (Schulze et al., 2003).  
A basic tenet of the concept of socioemotional wealth is that family owners are 
often motivated influenced by the intentions of the preservation of their affective stock, 
even if doing so comes at the financial expense of the company. That is, in family firms, 
with the increase of the family ownership and family control, the socioemotional wealth 
takes priority over other dimensions of the business and becomes the main reference 
point for decision making, influencing the way the firm is managed.  
Specific to family firm identity, Barnett, Eddleston, and Kellermanns (2009: 42) 
note that “based on theories of individual and social identity, it is possible that a family 
firm owner could regard the family as being more salient than the business and could 
thus overemphasize relationship concerns at the expense of business concerns.”  
Therefore, family identity which could lead to the preservation of socioemotional wealth 
is more salient than the economic identity in family firms.  
Family Firm Identity 
Combined with the organizational identity theory, the central family identity 
makes it the core to the family firms. Family firms intentionally perpetuate their family 
identity.  Any effort to substitute the family identity or add other identities to the family 
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identity is resisted as it raises fundamental questions about the nature of the firm.  
Managers in the family firms often find it too difficult to bring about a change in 
identity.  An enduring family identity also can be desirable because consistency over 
time is rewarded with legitimacy from external stakeholders.  When the family identity 
meets the external expectations, the family firm is rewarded with legitimacy from its 
family identity, thereby improving its chances of survival, acquiring and mobilizing 
resources, and financially prospering.  When family firms deviate from their family 
identity, it causes confusion among external stakeholders thus evoking disapproval, 
devaluation and sometimes even bringing long-term survival into question (Hsu & 
Hannan, 2005).   
Nonetheless, family firms also have profit motives.  As managers, the family 
members work toward the firm’s operational effectiveness.  The marketplace objectivity 
and profit discipline are necessary to achieve profitability.  In order to achieve a better 
financial performance, family firms need to strive for a healthy level of internal 
employee competition.  A good financial performance is the primary condition for 
family firms to survive.   
Therefore, family firms possess two major identities: family identity and 
economic identity.  As family firms, they are concerned primarily with the welfare and 
the unity of the family; as economic organizations they are required to be interested in 
return on investment and the viability of the firms. Because of simultaneous roles, family 
considerations can easily intrude on business decisions, and the reverse. The higher the 
family ownership and the family control are, the more intense the conflict between 
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family and economic considerations will be. Family, family ownership, and business 
issues are interwoven with each other; business discussions may be transformed into the 
arguments about family issues, while family decisions may not be made on the basis of 
company needs. Consequently, companies can suffer from a lack of marketplace 
objectivity and profit maximization motivation. 
When there is conflict between family and economic identities, family firms have 
two choices: substitution or addition of their identities (Albert & Whetten, 1985).  When 
the top managers decide to make a shift from one identity to another identity or add one 
identity to the primary identity, existing routines (such as resource allocation and 
retailing strategy) and symbolic elements (vision, mission, and so on) imprinted by the 
previous identity (Shinkle & Kriauciunas, 2012) inhibit the firm from accomplishing 
identity change.  So, when a firm adds one identity to the primary identity, it is temporal 
and it is very likely to create conflict between the multiple identities.  Therefore, in order 
to make economic identity to the family identity coexist or even substitute family 
identity with economic identity, family firms need to examine and revise routines and 
organizational practices supported by the family identity.  For example, Ward (1987) 
proposes a three-stage evolutionary model of the family firms. In the first stage, survival 
is the primary goal, the needs of the economic identity and the family identity are 
consistent; the owner-manager makes all decisions. Financial success also means family 
identity continuity.  In the second stage, the owner-manager keep his/her control, but the 
importance of the family’s relatives increases and more family members will be 
employed for the crucial positions.  As a consequence, the identities of the family firm 
 21 
 
are likely to diverge, reflecting the importance of family identity.  In the last stage, 
economic and family identities can come into conflict. The economic identity can 
become obsolesce and is in need of regeneration; the owner-manager retires; and 
maintenance of family harmony becomes the primary family goal. Again, economic 
identity is substituted by family identity. 
Similar to Ward’s (1987) three-stage development model, when family firms 
decide to extend their operation to foreign countries, the foreign expansion can create 
economic and family identity conflict.  The choice of mode of entry is a critical factor 
which could avoid or intensify the conflicts. 
Mode of Entry 
An entry mode is a business decision for implementing international strategies 
and conducting international business transactions by which all future decisions are 
influenced (Andersen, 1997; Kumar & Subramaniam, 1997). In the entry mode 
literature, whether or not to control the subsidiaries is an important decision because it is 
an indicator for resource commitment, potential risks and return on assets for firms 
entering foreign markets (Anderson & Gatignon, 1986). 
Control represents a firm’s ability to influence systems, methods, and decisions.  
It helps a firm to have a critical impact on the future of MNEs.  Without control, a firm 
may find it more difficult and costly to coordinate actions with its local partners, carry 
out strategies, implement its values and beliefs, and resolve the disputes that invariably 
arise especially when two parties to a contract pursue their self interests (Davidson, 
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1982).  Further, the MNE can use its control to obtain a larger share of the subsidiaries’ 
profits.  In short, control is a way to mitigate transaction costs and obtain a higher return.  
Yet control, while obviously desirable, also carries a high cost (Vernon, 1983).  
To take control, the MNEs must take full responsibility for every decision.  However, 
the MNEs may be unwilling or not able to carry out this responsibility in an uncertain 
foreign environment. Control also involves commitment of resources.  This in turn 
creates sunk costs and reduces the firm’s resource slack and flexibility. Resource 
commitment also increases the firm’s possibility of unexpected losses due to institutional 
differences (Davidson, 1982; Brouthers, 2002). Thus, the trade-off between control and 
risks isone of the main problems that a firm needs to consider when it decides to invest 
in a foreign country (Anderson & Gatignon, 1986).   
In this study, I mainly focus on two types of high control entry modes: 
acquisition and Greenfield investment.  Acquisition is an entry mode through which a 
firm from one country acquires a stake in or purchases all assets of a firm located in 
another country.  The ability of an acquisition to provide rapid access to new markets is 
a key reason to use acquisition as an entry mode. Actually, acquisition is regarded as one 
of the quickest means for firms to enter international markets (Hitt, Ireland, & 
Hoskisson, 2012). However, the firm completing the acquisition must deal not only with 
different corporate cultures inside of the firm, but also with potentially different social 
cultures and practices in the foreign country.  These cultural differences make 
integrating the two firms after the acquisition more challenging. Therefore, it is more 
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difficult to capture the potential synergy when integration is slowed or impossible 
because of cultural differences. 
Comparatively, a Greenfield venture is an entry mode through which a firm 
invests directly in another country or market by establishing a new wholly owned 
subsidiary.  This entry mode offers maximum control to the firm and has the greatest 
amount of potential to contribute to the firm’s strategy as it implements international 
strategies. The risks associated with Greenfield venture are significant in that the costs of 
establishing a new subsidiary in a new country or market can be substantial. 
Although previous literature has examined the trade-offs between acquisition and 
Greenfield investment (Gatignon & Anderson, 1988), the choice of acquisition and 
Greenfield investment involves some special trade-offs for family firms. Some studies 
suggest that a MNE may prefer acquiring local firms to compensate for its lack of 
knowledge in an unfamiliar environment, relying on local employees to contribute local 
knowledge (Gatignon & Anderson, 1988; Shenkar, 2001).  By co-managing the venture 
with local employees, the MNE can better manage the subsidiaries, learning from their 
local employees.  Furthermore, the local employees can manage the labor force and 
continue their relationship with suppliers, customers, and government authorities 
(Stopford & Wells, 1972; Hennart, 2009). In this way MNEs realize their economic 
goals.  However, when family firms choose to acquire a local firm, the local culture and 
the firm’s previous identity may stay in the subsidiary for a long time.  This will 
sabotage or at least weaken its family identity.  On the other hand, Greenfield investment 
also provides some advantages over acquisition despite its disadvantages of being costly 
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and risky to establish new ventures.  For example, it is easier to maintain absolute 
control.  This is especially meaningful for family firms because they pay more attention 
to the family identity preservation.  
This study contributes to the current mode of entry research by incorporating the 
identity conflicts into the mode of entry choice.  A local acquisition is often a rational 
way to realize economic identity.  However, by using a Greenfield investment, family 
firms can preserve their family identity to the greatest extent (Table 2).   
Behavioral Agency Model and Mode of Entry 
According to behavioral agency model (Wiseman & Gomez-Mejia, 1998; 
Gomez-Mejia, Welbourne & Wiseman, 2000), the risk preferences change with the 
reference point. The gains or losses relative to a reference point serve as a base on which 
to make a choice from available options. Behavioral agency model predicts that decision 
makers are always trying to avoid a loss of family identity even if this means accepting a 
higher economic risk.  Further, risk bearing is subjective, representing perceived losses 
to a decision maker’s endowment. 
Pareto efficiency or Pareto optimality is a state of economic resources allocation 
in which it is impossible to make any one better off without making at least one 
individual worse off. If a change to a different allocation that makes at least one 
individual better off without making any other individual worse off, there exists Pareto 
improvement.  In this study, I discuss the possibility of Pareto improvement between 
economic identity and family identity when a MNE chooses between Greenfield 
investment and acquisition.  To be specific, I investigate the possibility of strengthening 
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economic identity in a family firm without weakening its family identity when it chooses 
between two different entry modes: acquisition and Greenfield investment. 
Applying the behavioral agency model logic to the family firm’s international 
strategy, the preservation of family and economic identity can be considered as two 
reference points and the preservation of family identity is family firms’ primary 
reference point.  The identity choice achieves Pareto efficiency which means a choice of 
acquisition or Greenfield investment cannot increase economic identity and family 
identity simultaneously.  As shown in Table 3, when both family identity and economic 
identity are high, the choice of mode of entry is very difficult as we predicted.  Family 
firms may avoid international diversification since they have no motivation to invest 
overseas.  The addition of one identity to the primary identity may cause confusion and 
conflict in the firms.  There is no Pareto efficiency in this circumstance.  When family 
identity is high and economic identity is low, family identity becomes the primary 
identity, Greenfield investment help the family firms achieve Pareto efficiency.  When 
family identity is low and economic identity is high, acquisition is a better choice and 
help family firms achieve Pareto efficiency. Finally, when both family identity and 
economic identity are low, the family firms are willing to take risks and choose joint 
venture as their mode of entry since firms have no motivation to preserve either of these 
identities. 
In the following part, I discuss the potential Pareto improvement under certain 
institutional environments.  When we take the institutional condition into consideration, 
specifically economic, regulatory, and political institutional distance, there is a 
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possibility that family firms could simultaneously preserve economic and family identity 
when they choose either acquisition or Greenfield investment as their mode of entry. 
Institutional Environment 
The extent to which family firms can preserve economic and family identity 
simultaneously is also dependent on the institutional environment in the host and home 
countries.  I identified three institutional dimensions which have been widely discussed 
in the previous literature, type, distance, and distance direction, to characterize the 
internal and external institutional environment. 
Institutional polycentrism is a theoretical concept suggesting that institutions are 
multi-centered systems rather than monocentric (single-centered) hierarchies. 
Polycentricity refers to a complex system of mutually adjusting multiple power centers 
that operates as a spontaneous order (Polanyi, 1951). Polycentric institutions are defined 
as multiple, configurational, and context-specific institutions that originated from, are 
situated in, and enforced by numerous decision-making power centers (Batjargal et al, 
2013; Ostrom, 2005).  Institutional multiplicity exemplifies how multiple institutions 
and their different isormophic mechanisms form a society’s system of institutions. An 
institutional configuration exemplifies the integration of multiple institutions and their 
interaction with other dimensions of the external environment.  Previous work suggests 
that the confluence of multiple institutions, such as regulatory, political, and economic 
institutions, influences firm performance (Batjargal et al., 2013).   This study extends the 
current institutional polycentricity concept by examining the integration of firm level 
and country level institutions and how they collectively affect mode of entry choices in 
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the family firm internationalization process. Thus, it examines the multilevel influence 
of institutions. 
Organizational Level Institutions 
From an institution theory point of view, institutions create the “rules of the 
game” for a firm’s activities (North, 1990).  These rules include requirements, 
constraints, enforcement mechanisms, and incentive structures (Dunning & Lundan, 
2008; Meyer et al., 2009; Peng, 2003).   
Analogue to the country level institutions, organizational level institutions are 
the creation of collective meaning structures through social processes by “rules of 
games” inside the organizations.  These institutions are concerned with the symbolic and 
cognitive aspects of organizational life and captures the roles of explanation, 
interpretation, emotion, values, and belief in organizations.  Organizational level 
institutions are based on a closed systems perspective marked by the explanation of 
organizational life with reference to intra-organizational factors and characterized by a 
focus on internal learning and socialization processes in the organizational search for 
identity.  Thus, organizational level institutions influence identity construction through 
collective sense making. 
 The difference between country level institutions and organizational level 
institutions is that country level institutions lead to the isomorphism and conformity 
among organizations while organizational level institutions produce similarities in 
behavior across individuals within organizations.  Firms conform to the country level 
institutions in order to gain external legitimacy; individuals in firms conform to the 
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organizational level institutions to obtain internal legitimacy. Organizations tout their 
uniqueness by creating identity.  Identity and practice are intentionally created anew and 
celebrated by actors within organizations.  Actors in organizations create organizational 
institutions in order to establish unique identity and internal legitimacy, to distinguish 
their organizations, and to symbolize and affect the goals of rationality and justice. 
It is critical for individuals within firms to create and maintain organizational 
institutions that are consistent with their identities.  For instance, if a firm decides to 
create an identity of caring for its stakeholders, it needs to build the organizational level 
institutions that incorporate these stakeholder groups into the normal part of 
organizational life.  Accordingly, not only are employees are motivated to include 
external stakeholders into their daily routines, but the external stakeholders are also 
encouraged to behave as members of the organization.  For example, investors are 
encouraged to align their personal values with the firm, whereas customers who join 
customer loyalty programs are intended to consider themselves as organizational 
members.  Suppliers, unions, and local communities become partners with the firm. In 
this way, the organizational institutions convey the organization’s identity. 
Family Firm Identity and Organizational Level Institutions 
Specific to organizational identity, the culture, norms and policies that support 
family firms’ family or economic identities are family identity institutions or economic 
identity institutions.  Scott (2008) described identity as one of the principal “carriers” 
that sustain the cognitive pillar of institutions.  Organizational identity links an 
organization to the institutions in its environment, and establishing an organizational 
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identity is a crucial element of gaining legitimacy and forming an organization as a 
viable entity.  The stream of literature on ecological categories, markets, and 
organizational forms (Hannan, 2005; Hsu & Hannan, 2005; Polos et al., 2002) asserts 
that external audiences hold “identity codes” or perceptions about what it means to be a 
prototypical member of a category and, consequently, have expectations about how the 
organization will and should act. Institutional pressures to conform to this identity 
become pronounced (Benner, 2007; Porac Wade, & Pollock, 1999; Zuckerman, 1999). 
When the organization’s identity meets the expectations that are perceived by external 
stakeholders, the organization is rewarded with legitimacy, thereby improving its 
chances of acquiring and mobilizing resources. When organizations deviate from these 
identity codes which means they update their organizational institutions, it causes 
confusion among audiences thus evoking disapproval, devaluation and sometimes even 
bringing long-term survival into question (Hannan, 2005).  
For example, Czarniawska and Wolff (1998) focused on the issue of how 
identity could facilitate (or undermine) legitimacy and success for newcomers. They 
found that the university that is able to attune to its institutional environment and 
construct an identity similar to the other universities in its organizational field has a 
better chance to survive. Similar to Czarniawska and Wolff (1998), Clegg et al. (2007) 
found that organizations form identities that afford them a unique position within an 
industry. A different approach by Corley and Gioia (2004) emphasized the perceptions 
and actions of organization members experiencing a profound identity change.  They 
found that when the spun-off organization attempted to establish its identity as an 
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independent entity in a different industry than its parent, its members were presented 
with a major challenge.   
However, research from an institutional theory perspective has most often 
tended to investigate particular aspects of organizational identity formation rather than 
the overall processes through which it occurs.  Scholars did not explicitly account for 
internal processes that affected the specifics of organizational identity features (Gioia et 
al., 2013).  I propose in this study that the identity formation is supported by internal 
culture, norms and institutions which define “rules of game” inside the firms. Suchman 
(1995: 576) claims that the culture system provides “cultural definitions that determine 
how the organization is built, how it is run, and simultaneously, how it is understood and 
evaluated.”  These internal culture, norms and institutions help form a firm’s identity.  In 
family firms, the different internal culture, norms and institutions that provide support to 
either family identity or economic identity constitute organizational level institutions. 
In family firms, especially the later stage of the family firms (Gersick, 1991; 
Romanelli & Tushman, 1994; Ward, 1987), family identity has been developed as a 
prototype.  Once a firm is recognized as a family firm by internal and external 
stakeholders, the behavior conformity to the expectation from those stakeholders not 
only improves firms’ legitimacy, but also constrains the firms’ decision making.  The 
family identity formation creates the organizational culture, organizational policies, and 
routines that help the organization determine the strategy and structure that preserve the 
family identity.   
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Identity Conflict and Organizational Level Polycentricity 
The conflict between family and economic identities, the addition of economic 
identity to family identity, or the strengthening of family identity and the weakening of 
economic identity can dramatically change firms’ organizational institutions.   
The norms, culture, policies and routines related to economic identity and those 
related to family identity often are contradictory to each other.  For example, because of 
family nepotism, altruism, and CEO entrenchment, family executives are sometimes less 
competent, more likely to appropriate firm assets for personal use (Morck et al., 2005, 
Morck & Yeung, 2003), more risk averse (Le Breton-Miller et al., 2011, Schulze et al. 
2001), and less motivated to invest in innovation and training programs (Bertrand & 
Schoar 2006, Bloom & Van Reenen 2007, Gomez-Mejia et al. 2010).  These practices 
are contrary to maintaining an economic identity.  In order to solve this problem, family 
firms have to choose to emphasize one identity and pay less attention to another identity.  
However, because the family firms can only survive when they achieve the 
economic profitability, the co-existence of family and economic identities is inevitable.  
The integration of economic identity and family identity means family firms have to 
integrate the institutions supporting economic identity and institutions that support 
family identity.  The advantage of integrating the two identities is that decision-making 
can be centralized. In turn, the efficiency and privacy of the decision-making process are 
increased. Because of the ownership control and the availability of financial information 
and family information, decision-makers can quickly and discretely act in the best 
interest of both the economic and family identities.  
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While the integration of economic and family identities could be beneficial, 
decision-making can be especially efficient, loyalty is high and cooperation is abundant, 
there are negative outcomes when economic and family identities are emphasized 
simultaneously.  In general, institutions, such as norms, policies and culture, supporting 
family identity and economic identity are normally contradictory.  For example, family 
identity traditionally seeks internal unity and tries to suppress or deny rivalry among 
members, whereas economic identity often strives for a healthy level of internal 
competition.  In this framework of double-identity, either competitiveness within the 
firm, or family unity may be sacrificed if the family firm attempts to preserve both the 
economic and the family identities simultaneously. Also, the family firms could be 
suffering from “norm confusion” (Tagiuri & Davis, 1996), and finally the norm 
confusion may threaten family firms’ legitimacy and survival. 
Hence, a better choice for many family firms is to substitute one identity for the 
other instead of integration of them.  The substitution of identities could solve the “norm 
confusion” problem, but it creates other problems.  According to organizational 
imprinting theory, organizations are shaped by their founding institutional environment 
(Stinchcombe, 1965; Kogut & Zander, 2000).  Imprinting research has found long-
lasting effects of norms and operating practices of firms (Bamford, Dean, & McDougall, 
2000; Boeker, 1989; Kimberly, 1979).  Family firms will be constrained in their ability 
to adapt to new environments due to imprinted structures and practices established for 
their original identity.  
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Given the advantages and disadvantages of identity integration and identity 
substitution, the two identities of family firms usually exist simultaneously, but one 
identity is dominant during a period of time.  The balance of family and economic 
identities is very important and the co-evolving, co-existing, and integrative nature of 
family and economic identity represent a form of organization level institutional 
polycentricity.  
When a family firm invests in a foreign country, the possibility of conflict 
between economic and family identity is intensified and the need for economic identity 
and family identity to co-exist and co-evolve is urgent.  The liability of foreignness 
forces the family firms to pay more attention to their economic identity.  The ignorance 
of the economic identity could threaten the subsidiaries survival.  On the other hand, 
operating in a foreign country may make the control and family identity preservation 
more difficult, especially when acquisition is chosen as the mode of entry.   Family firms 
need to develop strategies and structures to maintain their family identity.  Further, the 
local government may encourage the family firms to choose family identity as their 
primary identity because family identity prompts the firms to perform higher levels of 
corporate social responsibility, better community citizenship (Berrone et al., 2010; Dyer 
& Whetten, 2006; Post, 1993), and stronger commitment to philanthropic activities 
(Deniz-Deniz & Cabrera-Suarez, 2008).  The conflict and trade-off between family and 
economic identities creates a complex organizational level institutional environment that 
influences the behavior of the family firms (Tagiuri & Davis, 1996).  The authorities 
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from organizations and local government interact to determine the balance of family and 
economic identities.   
Country Level Institutions 
The theory of institutional polycentrism suggests that different types of rules 
originate from and are situated in multiple rule-making “centers” but their effects occur 
in configurational and integrated manners (Ostrom, 2005; Batjargal et al, 2013).  For 
example, economic rules originate from and are situated in multiple monetary and fiscal 
institutions; regulatory rules originate from and are situated in numerous regulatory 
forces; political institutions based on rules and standards established by governments.  
The economic, regulatory, and political institutions are developed and co-evolve in 
combinative ways.  This creates a complex and configured institutional environment that 
influences the behavior of organizations, groups, and individuals (North, 2005; Ostrom, 
2005).  The country level institutional polycentricity represents a system of national 
governance in which authorities from different and overlapping jurisdictions interact to 
determine the overall conditions and constraints under which units of governance, e.g., 
organizations and citizens, are authorized to act (McGinnis, 2011).  Thus, country level 
institutional polycentricity is represented through a set of multiplicity, configurational, 
and context-specific institutional rules, norms and prescriptions.  MNEs operate in 
polycentric institutional settings in which they are influenced by the combination of 
country level institutions (Oakerson & Parks, 1999; Ostrom, 1990; 2005). 
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Country Level Institution Type 
Three formal institutions--regulatory, political, and economic--were identified in 
previous research as three prominent national formal institutions (Holmes, Miller, Hitt, 
& Salmador, 2013). 
Economic institutions are primarily composed of a country’s monetary and fiscal 
policies (e.g., Fischer, 1993; Lucas, 2003), and entails the rules and standards that shape 
the availability and accessibility of the country’s financial resources, which in turn 
support financial investments. Such “financial factors are an integral part of [a country’s] 
growth process” (Levine & Zervos, 1998: 554).  The money supply and investment 
funds in a host country determine the financial resources a MNE has access to in the host 
country. Further, the money market illiquidity and inflexible exchange rates 
disadvantage MNEs disproportionately. 
Regulatory institutions are important for a governmental body’s effort to monitor 
and control the activities and behaviors of local and foreign organizations operating 
within a country. Regulatory institutions establish rules and policies to reduce 
uncertainty about the operating activities of organizations by standardizing practices and 
implementing enforcement. Although the scope and content of regulations vary in 
countries, they represent society’s expectations and preferences (North, 1990; Scott, 
1995). For example, regulatory institutions enact and enforce protect property rights 
laws and restrict or promote the activities of foreign organizations (Bekaert, Harvey, & 
Lundblad, 2005; Spicer, McDermott, & Kogut, 2000).  When the regulatory institutions 
such as contract and property rights and monetary policies are less effective, MNEs are 
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more likely to suffer from the opportunistic behavior of the local partners, suppliers, 
customers, and so on. MNEs need to find other ways to obtain permission and licenses, 
re-enforce contracts, and curb predatory practices of the “grabbing hands” of 
governments which used to describe the corrupt behavior occurring in a disorganized 
way that leads to the personal enrichment of government officials, to the detriment of the 
rule of law and private business development (Batjargal, 2003; Frye, 2000; Frye & 
Shleifer, 1997).  
Political institutions are rules and standards established by governments that 
define the nature of the political process (Hillman & Keim, 1995). Political institutions 
include how power is distributed within government (such as the power distribution 
between legislation and enforcement) (Henisz, 2000), which group of individuals are 
allowed to participate in it, and how the political rights are exercised (Persson, 2002). 
More importantly, the political institutions also constitute the rules and standards for 
institutional evolution establishing new institutions and altering existing ones. It is a 
critical function because it influences the stability of the political institutional 
environment and the expectation and predictability of changes in that environment 
(DiMaggio & Powell, 1991). MNEs from less democratic economies are accustomed to 
operating in environments with weak formal institutions. In environments where formal 
institutions such as laws, rules and regulations are weak, informal institutions commonly 
play a major role in economic activities (Peng & Heath, 1996). Moreover, even with the 
existence of formal institutions (such as certain regulations), MNEs may question the 
logic and efficiency of the regulations. When the subsidiaries of these MNEs are forced 
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to operate in economies in which institutions are clear and officially articulated, they 
need to collect, and interpret the information about the formal institutions and their 
nuanced effects on business practices. MNE subsidiaries’ performance is significantly 
influenced by how effectively they learn to interpret institutional requirements when 
they do business in countries with well-developed institutions.   
Institutional Distance 
Kostova (1999) defines institutional distance as the difference between two 
countries’ institutional environment profiles.  Institutional distance is perhaps the main 
cause of liability of foreignness.  The liability of foreignness caused by institutional 
distance takes effect in four ways (Eden & Miller, 2004).  First, foreign firms generally 
have less information than domestic firms about the host country institutions. The 
unfamiliarity of the institutional environment creates costs of acquiring this information.  
Second, foreign firms may sometimes receive biased and injustice treatment from the 
host country government and/or buyers and suppliers compared to domestic firms. 
Lastly, foreign firms may face foreign exchange risks because foreign firms do not 
receive and pay foreign currencies simultaneously. Again, local firms do not face the 
possible foreign exchange risks. 
Kostova (1999) argues that when institutional distance is high, the transfer of 
practices is difficult.  Similarly, the main conclusion from the mode of entry research is 
that when the institutional distance between home and host country is high, MNEs will 
not choose a Greenfield investment (Hennart & Larimo, 1998; Xu & Shenkar, 2002).  It 
is difficult for MNEs to manage their foreign affiliates when institutional distance is 
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high. Such management will be more difficult to achieve if the subsidiary is a locally 
acquired firm.  Hence, previous work suggests a positive relationship between 
institutional distance and utilization of Greenfield investment as a mode of entry into a 
foreign market (Kostova, 1999; Luo & Shenkar, 2011).   
 This study contributes to the institutional distance-mode of entry literature by 
differentiating economic, regulatory, and political institutional effects on family firm 
internationalization when they are facing family-economic identity conflict. Actually, 
the institutional distance increases the family-economic identity conflict. Moreover, by 
choosing between Greenfield investment and acquisition, family firms can enhance or 
reduce the conflict. 
In addition, despite the distinct characteristics of economic, regulatory, and political 
institutions, the concept of institutional polycentricity suggests that attention should be 
given to their integrated effects and those of the country level and organizational level 
institutions as well.  Barkema, Bell, and Pennings (1996) coined the term “double 
layered acculturation” to describe the conflict between foreign national and corporate 
culture.  They argue that MNEs are required to calibrate themselves to a foreign national 
culture and gain internal (the culture consistency of parents and the subsidiaries) and 
external legitimacy (the culture conformity when home and host country cultures are 
different) simultaneously.  This study was based on the experience of 13 Dutch firms 
and their 225 foreign ventures between 1966 and 1988. As expected, entry was more 
successful when the target country’s culture was similar to the company’s domestic 
culture. The study also found that dealing with both country and company cultural 
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differences diminished entry success. Although such double-layered acculturation was 
difficult for a firm’s immediate expansion, the intensified learning improved future 
expansion efforts. In other words, these firms learned about foreign cultures, and then 
applied that learning to increase future success. 
Extending the notion of “double layered acculturation,” this study focuses on the 
internal and external legitimacy conflicts caused by internal identity and their supported 
internal norms, values and routines and the external host and home country institutional 
distance.  The empirical results show that by choosing a specific mode of entry, the 
family firms might achieve internal and external legitimacy when they implement 
internationalization strategies. 
The Direction of Institutional Distance 
Previous literature has focused on the influence of absolute institutional distance on 
internationalization (Xu & Shenkar, 2002; Xu, Pan, & Beamish, 2004).  However, the 
direction of institutional distance matters, not only the absolute value of that distance. 
Increasing numbers of MNEs from emerging markets are now investing in foreign 
countries.  The effect of institutional distance on MNEs from a developed country 
investing in emerging markets is dramatically different from the effect of institutional 
distance on MNEs from emerging markets investing in developed countries.  Therefore, 
the direction of institutional distance needs to be considered in addition to the absolute 
institutional distance.  For example, US regulatory institutions are more favorable to 
foreign firms than in China.  While the absolute institutional distance between the 
United States and China is the same, the liability of foreignness associated with a 
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Chinese MNE investing in the United States (moving from a less favorable institutional 
environment to a more favorable institutional environment) should differ from those 
associated with a US MNE investing in China (moving from a more favorable 
institutional environment to a less favorable institutional environment).   
More likely, the MNEs from countries with less favorable institutions face higher 
liabilities of foreignness when they invest in countries with more favorable institutions 
(Xu & Hitt, 2012).  Unlike their counterparts from countries with more favorable 
institutions, MNEs from countries with less favorable institutions face greater challenges 
in obtaining legitimacy when entering the highly competitive global markets. In addition 
to liability of foreignness, which is a universal problem for all MNEs, MNEs from 
countries with less favorable institutions often suffer from two additional problems: 
liability of newness (Luo & Rui, 2009; Luo & Tung, 2007) and the lack of operational 
experience in environments with more favorable formal institutions.  Most of the MNEs 
from countries with less favorable institutions are smaller and more resource-constrained 
than their counterparts in the developed countries.  The resource constraints make it 
more difficult for them to engage in some costly activities such as information collection 
and a learning process that is long, in order to mitigate the liabilities. MNEs from 
countries with less favorable institutions also are accustomed to operating in country 
environments where informal institutions are more influential than formal institutions 
(Peng & Heath, 1996). Learning about how to navigate in environments with strong 
formal institutions, therefore, is crucial to the survival of MNEs from emerging markets 
when these MNEs enter global markets. 
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In sum, the direction of institutional distance is more important than absolute 
institutional distance in the current global environment.   
Having conceptualized family firm identities and country level institutions, I now 
move to develop the hypotheses in my proposed model.  I first develop the hypotheses of 
the interactive effects of family firm identities and economic identity and economic 
institutional distance.  Following this, I develop the hypotheses of the interactive effects 
of family firm identities and regulatory and political institutional distance. 
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HYPOTHESES 
Economic Identity and Mode of Entry 
From the economic identity perspective, the choice of entry mode is determined 
by the comparative costs between a Greenfield investment and an acquisition.  
Transaction cost theory has been primarily used to analyze the relationship between 
mode of entry choice and financial performance.  Transaction costs related to the choice 
between a Greenfield investment and an acquisition involve the costs of building a brand 
new firm as compared to the costs of acquiring an existing firm in a foreign country.  
Transaction costs refer to the costs of searching and negotiating with a potential target 
and the costs of monitoring the acquirees (Agarwal & Ramaswami, 1992; Erramilli & 
Rao, 1993; Gatignon & Anderson, 1988; Hennart, 1991; Hill, 1990; Makino & Neupert, 
2000; Williamson, 1985). 
However, a firm may encounter increased costs in searching, negotiating or 
monitoring a target either (1) because it is difficult to estimate and include all 
contingencies in the acquisition contract beforehand, or (2) because it is impossible to 
receive a fair price due to information asymmetry and opportunism (Taylor et al., 1998; 
Williamson, 1985). Furthermore, it is difficult to monitor and enforce the acquisition 
contracts due to geographical distance, communication problems or the lack of reliable 
measurable outputs (Hill, 1990; Williamson, 1985). Scholars find that when the 
transaction costs associated with searching, negotiating and monitoring a potential target 
are low, firms tend to rely on the acquisition as their mode of entry to realize the 
economic objectives. But as these transaction costs increase, firms will switch their 
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preference to modes which they have more control, such as a Greenfield investment 
(e.g., Taylor et al., 1998; Erramilli & Rao, 1993; Hennart, 1991; Gatignon & Anderson, 
1988; Anderson & Gatignon, 1986). 
Therefore, the mode of entry choice is contingent on other factors.  However, 
specific to family firms, their intention to preserve the economic identity and financial 
performance determines that family firms prefer to exclusively use internal financial 
sources and the limited liquidity thereof make them find that acquisitions provide better 
opportunities either because (1) they do not increase the number of competitors in the 
market, hence not severely affecting rivalry’s  competition strategies, (2) can reduce the 
resource commitment, or (3) reduce the market exit costs which is related to lower 
resource commitment (Kim & Hwang, 1992).  Therefore,  
Hypothesis 1: There is a negative relationship between economic identity and the 
choice of Greenfield investment as mode of entry. 
Family Identity and Mode of Entry 
There are two main reasons to expect a negative relationship between family 
ownership and acquisition. First, many scholars (e.g., Gómez-Mejia et al.  2007; 
Anderson & Reeb, 2003) have argued that family firms have different values and goals 
than non-family ones, and these differences may affect these firms’ international 
strategy. In general, family firms perceive longer time horizons than non-family firms 
because the current generation owners feel an obligation to preserve wealth for the future 
generations (Casson, 1999; Chrisman, et al., 2005; Bruton, Ahlstrom, & Obloj, 2008; 
Eddleston, Kellermanns, & Sarathy, 2008). Claver, Rienda, and Quer (2009) have drawn 
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attention to the general reluctance of family firms to embrace change that comes with the 
internationalization process, preferring stability and direct control. Gómez-Mejia, Makri, 
and Larraza-Kintana (2010) suggest that family firms may be reluctant to implement an 
international strategy because internationalization typically involves higher debt levels 
which may mean a higher risk of loss of control. Internationalization may require 
resources and expertise from external stakeholders (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978), and this 
can also dilute family control. In order to maintain family identity and preserve SEW, 
family firms are reluctant to engage in internationalization.  Fernández and Nieto (2006) 
suggest that the more centralized decision-making in family firms may negatively affect 
the likelihood of international strategies being pursued.  
Second, previous studies on finance and corporate governance indicate that 
family firms’ equity holdings are usually more concentrated, resulting in limited 
liquidity (e.g. Anderson & Reeb, 2003; Demsetz & Lehn, 1985; Faccio, Lang, & Young, 
2001; Shleiffer & Vishny, 1986, 1997). Consequently, family shareholders may be 
affected more severely by the company’s non-systematic risks than other types of 
investors who invest to diversified portfolios (e.g., institutional investors) (Maug, 1998). 
Family shareholders may try to undertake certain corporate level strategies, such as 
internationalalization, to mitigate the risks (Chang, 2003). Sirmon, Arregle, Hitt, and 
Webb (2008) suggest that internationalization allows family firms to leverage their 
current resources in foreign, more favorable international markets, and provide a source 
of key knowledge and capabilities usable to leverage existing resources or create new 
resources. But such endeavors cannot reduce ﬁrm-speciﬁc ﬁnancial risks created by 
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undiversiﬁed portfolios (Douma, George, & Kabir, 2006; Yeh, Lee, & Woidtke, 2001). 
The company’s failure may lead to the loss of all returns for family ﬁrms. Hence, family 
ﬁrms are less tolerant of risks, and exhibit higher prudence in resource commitment. 
Compared with non-family firms, family ﬁrms tend to shy away from risky investments 
and the strategies through which control might be lost (Anderson & Reeb, 2003; 
Chatterjee, Lubatkin, & Schulze, 1999; Wiseman & Gomez-Mejia, 1998). Arregle, 
Naldi, Nordqvist, and Hitt (2012) suggest that the higher the environmental uncertainty 
faced by a family firm, the more costs it experiences in accessing resources for 
internationalization, resulting in a reluctance to internalize the firm’s operations. 
In sum, applying the behavioral agency model to the analysis (Wiseman & 
Gomez-Mejia, 1998; Gomez-Mejia, Welbourne & Wiseman, 2000; Larraza-Kintana et 
al., 2007), family owners are willing to bear greater financial risk when alternative, more 
conservative international strategy, such as the choice of acquisition as the mode of 
entry, may result in diminished socioemotional wealth (SEW) and family control. 
Therefore, when family firms are engaging in international strategy, preserving the 
family control is their primary goal.  Therefore, I propose a positive relationship between 
family identity and the choice of Greenfield investment instead of acquisition. 
Hypothesis 2: There is a positive relationship between family identity and the 
choice of Greenfield investment as mode of entry. 
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Institutional Distance, Family Firm Identity, and Mode of Entry 
Three institutions--economic, regulatory, and political-- are examined in this 
study as three types of formal institutions. 
Positive Institutional Distance (Institutions in Host Country Are More Favorable 
Than Institutions in Home Country). Institutional voids (e.g., weak legal protection for 
property rights or intellectual property rights, poor enforcement of commercial laws, 
lack of transparency of  judicial and litigation systems, inefficient factor markets, and 
underdeveloped market intermediaries) and political hazards (e.g., political instability, 
unpredictable regulatory changes, government interference, and corruption  in public 
service and government sectors) in the home country erode firms’ competitiveness in 
domestic markets, thus influencing family firms to contemplate using strategies to enter 
international markets.  Although it is possible for firms to develop the skills and 
networks to handle such institutional constraints, it is always costly for a firm to deal 
with the institutional voids and political hazards, especially in a foreign country.  By  
selecting to operate in an institutionally more efficient, transparent and munificent 
environment without such constraints and hazards, family firms could avoid the costly 
process and thus be able to concentrate on building, exploiting and upgrading their 
capabilities (and hopefully competitive  advantages) in international  markets. 
When family firms invest in host countries with more favorable institutions, such 
as emerging market firms entering developed markets, the family firms enjoy the 
advantage of more developed local institutional environments than they have at home 
(Witt & Lewin, 2007).  The liability of foreignness is lower in the favorable institutional 
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environment, compared to firms from countries with a favorable institutional 
environment investing in countries with less favorable institutional environments.  The 
well-established institutions in the host country provide supportive services to foreign 
firms.  The efficient infrastructure promotes economic transactions (McEvily & Zaheer, 
1999).  The favorable economic institutions also help foreign family firms to access 
critical resources for their foreign operations (Meyer, Esrin, Bhaumik, & Peng, 2009).  
So, this environment facilities family firms use of a Greenfield investment as a mode of 
entry (and preserve family identity as well as to realize economic identity).  Under such 
circumstances, the choice of a Greenfield investment as the mode of entry demonstrates 
clear Pareto improvement over the choice of an acquisition as the mode of entry because 
a Greenfield investment can preserve both economic identity and family identity (SEW 
thereof).  Family firms do not have to sacrifice one identity in order to improve another 
identity. Figure 2 shows that family firms are able to preserve family and economic 
identities simultaneously when institutional environment is favorable in host country. 
Positive Economic Institutional Distance (Economic Institutions in Host Country 
Are More Favorable Than Economic Institutions in Home Country). Economic 
institutions are mainly composed of a country’s monetary and fiscal policies (e.g., 
Fischer, 1993; Lucas, 2003), and embody the rules and standards that determine the 
availability and value of the country’s financial resources. It is important to a foreign 
firm because economic institutional environment also supports capital investments and 
spending.  More developed financial infrastructure and capital markets reduce 
transaction costs for local financial services, such as the multiple options of the payment 
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system.  Moreover, they facilitate access to complementary local finance, which can 
reduce foreign investors’ exposure to exchange rate risk.  Local customers are also more 
likely to gain access to bank credit, which can accelerate the demand for consumer 
goods that often are bought on credit.  Thus, developed financial institutions boost 
business opportunities and at the same time facilitate the functional entry for foreign 
investors.  Similarly, more developed market institutions reduce institutional uncertainty 
if bureaucratic interference in business transactions is subject to clear rules and 
regulation.  This applies notably to competition policy, which is important to protect 
consumers but can also be used to influence foreign entry mode.  For family firms, the 
favorable economic institutions allow them to reduce transaction costs, enhance business 
opportunities, obtain financial resources in the host country, and more importantly, 
compete with local rivals on a more equal basis.  Although family firms prefer internal 
financing and are facing limited liquidity because of their priority of protecting family 
control and family influence and preserving SEW, favorable economic institutions in the 
host country provide family firms abundant financial resources without the demand of 
family control. Thus, advantages of using acquisition are weakened. Therefore, family 
firms prefer a Greenfield investment to an acquisition because the Greenfield investment 
helps preserve their family identity and SEW and economic identity simultaneously.  
Thus, I propose:  
Hypothesis 3a: Economic institutional distance negatively moderates the 
relationship between economic identity and Greenfield entry mode when economic 
institutions are more favorable in the host country than in the home country. 
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Hypothesis 3b: Economic institutional distance positively moderates the 
relationship between family identity and Greenfield entry mode when economic 
institutions are more favorable in the host country than in the home country. 
Positive Regulatory Institutional Distance (Regulatory Institutions in Host 
Country Are More Favorable Than Regulatory Institutions in Home Country). Foreign 
entry-mode choice is a reflection of conformity of a foreign firms to the regulatory 
institutional environment in the host country.  The elements of the regulatory institutions 
include laws, rules, and standards that construct and constitute the standards and 
expectation of organizational and industrial action as well as ensure stability and order in 
societies (North, 1990, Scott & Meyer, 1994; Williamson, 1975, 1991).  Regulatory 
institutions can enact policies that facilitate or hinder economic growth, such as 
providing or constraining public goods and creating or banning laws to protect private 
property.  Thus, some government actions can promote a positive environment for MNE 
activities.  
When the regulatory institutions of the host country are more favorable than the 
regulatory institutions in the home country, there are two reasons for family firms to 
choose Greenfield investment as entry mode.  First, the liability of foreignness is lower 
in the favorable regulatory institutional environment.  When the institutional constraints 
are relatively low, family firms do not have to incorporate the local institutions to satisfy 
the regulatory requirements and achieve their legitimacy.  Second, because the local 
regulatory institutions are favorable to the foreign family firms, they do not have to deal 
with the biased institutions against foreign companies and other institutional 
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infrastructure; this will significantly reduce the transaction costs in the host country.  
Therefore, the favorable regulatory institutions make the acquisition to be an inferior 
choice for family firms even from economic point of view.  
As the SEW concept argues, in order to keep family control and family influence, 
the favorable regulatory institutional environment allows family firms to achieve this 
goal and use Greenfield investment as mode of entry. Further, the acquisition of a local 
firm could be costly because family firms have to build the internal legitimacy when 
they try to transfer their family identity into the local subsidiaries.  Therefore,  
Hypothesis 4a: Regulatory institutional distance negatively moderates the 
relationship between economic identity and Greenfield entry mode when regulatory 
institutions are more favorable in the host country than in the home country. 
Hypothesis 4b: Regulatory institutional distance positively moderates the 
relationship between family identity and Greenfield entry mode when regulatory 
institutions are more favorable in the host country than in the home country. 
Positive Political Institutional Distance (Political Institutions in Host Country 
Are More Favorable Than Political Institutions in Home Country). In some emerging 
economies, autocratic political institutions foster instability and unpredictability in the 
institutional environment. Policies are subject to the self-interests of a small number of 
individuals (Henisz, 2000) and, as such, often produce institutional voids because of the 
weak monitoring mechanisms available (Puffer, McCarthy, & Boisot, 2010). On the 
contrary, in most countries with more favorable political institutions, democratic 
political institutions provide opportunities to influence government decisions through 
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interest groups, election donations, and lobbying (Hillman, Keim, & Schuler, 2004). 
Furthermore, although there is a possibility for firms to influence the political 
institutions in both political environments; however, the ways they influence it are 
totally different.  In countries with institutional voids, firms usually turn to informal 
means such as networks and guanxi (Peng & Luo, 2000) to influence political 
institutions instead of using interest groups, elections and lobbying which are more 
common with democratic political institutions.  The political institutional distance 
between home and host countries suggests MNEs based in one type of political 
institution, need to have a good understanding of the political institutions in the host 
country that they enter. 
The ability of a government to credibly commit to and consistently enforce a 
given set of policies is of substantive interest to a firm’s international diversification 
strategy (Kobrin, Basek, Blank, & La Palombara, 1980). Where policy reliability and 
credibility is low, firms are more likely to minimize commitments to a market, or fully 
avoid investment (Henisz & Delios, 2001). Uncertainty from the political institutional 
environment magnifies difficulties in searching, interpreting, and utilizing the 
information necessary for a successful entry by foreign firms, increasing the relative 
costs of foreign investment, and decreasing the return on investment. When political 
institutions have high reliability and certainty, it is easier for a legislature and judicial 
branch to provide support their actions. Consequently, future policies are likely to be 
particularly flexible in response to exogenous shocks.  When a firm from a country with 
autocratic political institutions enters into a country with democratic political 
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institutions, the future policies are more predictable and it is easier to collect and 
interpret the information. Therefore, when family firms choose a Greenfield investment 
as the entry mode, they are operating in a more predictable, supportive, and less risky 
political environment while still maintaining family control. Following the SEW 
concept, Barney, Clark, and Alvarez (2002) use social network theory and propose that 
family ties reduces family members’ ability to build and maintain other strong social 
ties. The democratic political institutions considerably reduce the importance of social 
ties with the local political powers compared to autocratic political environment, and 
make Greenfield investment even more attractive from the family identity standpoint. 
Thus, favorable political institutions in the host country supports family identity and 
family SEW and also increases the economic opportunity of a Greenfield investment.  
Hypothesis 5a: Political institutional distance negatively moderates the 
relationship between economic identity and a Greenfield entry mode when political 
institutions are more democratic in the host country than in the home country. 
Hypothesis 5b: Political institutional distance positively moderates the 
relationship between family identity and Greenfield entry mode when political 
institutions are more democratic in the host country than in the home country. 
Negative Institutional Distance (Institutions in Host Country Are Less Favorable 
Than Institutions in Home Country). When the institutions of the host country are less 
favorable than the institutions of home country, there are two economic reasons for 
family firms to mitigate threats and achieve market legitimacy by acquiring a local firm.  
First, the family firm can mitigate the liability of foreignness by working with local 
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employees. As institutions are biased on foreign rather than domestic firms, acquisition 
can lessen some of the institutional bias more than if the subsidiary is Greenfield 
investment.  Second, family firms can benefit from “spillover effects” of their local 
employees. Not only do family firms benefit from local employees’ knowledge about 
and skills for handling the local government and other institutional organizations, they 
can also benefit from the reputational capital of their local employees. In other words, 
these local knowledge, skills, and reputational capital spill over to the foreign 
subsidiaries. Family firms can then signal their legitimacy to conduct business in the 
foreign market to the host countries’ institutional constituents. Previous empirical studies 
have found that more acquisitions are completed than Greenfield investments when the 
host country institutions are more restrictive (Contractor, 1990; Fagre & Wells, 1982; 
Gomes-Casseres, 1989; Lecraw, 1984). 
From the SEW standpoint, family firms try to retain control of their firms for the 
long term, and intend to concentrate their investment in their core business (Miller, Le-
Breton Miller, & Lester, 2010). However, the concentration of the operation also gives 
them incentives to diversify their portfolio through international diversification to retain 
control of the core business and spread the risks by international diversification. In this 
way, the family owners will be able to pass on the family business to later generations 
(Arregle, et al., 2007; Casson, 1999; Fiss & Zajac, 2004; Gomez-Mejia et al., 2007; 
Palmer et al., 1987). In an unstable and less favorable institutional environment, 
acquisition is a better mode of entry to reduce risk than Greenfield investment. 
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So, the family identity conflicts with economic identity when the institutions are 
less favorable in host country than in home country.  In the less favorable institutional 
environment, the transaction costs are high.  So, for the economic consideration, family 
firms should choose acquisition as their entry mode.  On the other hand, in order to 
preserve the family identity, SEW and retain family control, family firms have to 
sacrifice their economic identity.  There is no pure Pareto improvement, because 
pursuing economic identity will lead to the loss of family identity. Figure 3 shows the 
substitution between family and economic identities when family firms invest to a 
foreign country with a less favorable institutional environment.  
Negative Economic Institutional Distance (Economic Institutions in Host 
Country Are Less Favorable Than Economic Institutions in Home Country). The less 
developed economic institutions in the host country produce lower capital availability 
and market liquidity problems.  An extensive literature has shown that the economic 
institutions in the host country influence the mode of entry choice. Most of these studies 
have identified that domestic economic environment (Lehmann, 1999), market size 
(Cheng & Kwan, 2000; Tuman & Emmert, 1999), quality of infrastructure, labor cost, 
economic openness, and return on capital are some key variables that determines the 
MNEs’ mode of entry. 
When economic institutions are of poor quality, social actors have to rely on 
other sources to mitigate negative consequences of that dysfunctional institution 
(Herrmann, 2008).  For example, the tight money supply and shortage of investment 
funds in a less developed economic environment force firms to search for tangible 
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resources from diverse sources such as business angels, neighborhood lending groups, 
and other informal financial networks (McMillan & Woodruff, 1999; Tsai, 2002). 
Further, the money market illiquidity and inflexible exchange rates disadvantage foreign 
firms disproportionately. Therefore, the foreign firms mobilize bridging ties in their 
networks to overcome these difficulties (Stam & Elfring, 2008; Batjargal et al., 2013).  
In order to have a better access to these informal financial resources, foreign firms will 
choose acquisition instead of Greenfield investment as their entry mode.  By choosing 
acquisition as an entry mode, foreign firms establish the bridging ties with the help of 
their local employees.   
Although the preservation of SEW requires family control and influence, it also 
shows family owners’ intention to retain control of the core business and to pass it on to 
next generation (Arregle, et al., 2007; Casson, 1999; Fiss & Zajac, 2004; Gomez-Mejia 
et al., 2007; Palmer et al., 1987). In order to avoid risky investment and build enduring 
relationships with internal and external stakeholders of the firm and sustain the core 
business and reduce risk, family firms will find international diversification to be a 
viable choice to achieve that goal. Among the mode of entry choices, acquisition is a 
superior choice. The less resource commitment helps family firms spread the risks in an 
unfavorable economic institutional environment. In addition, the acquired subsidiaries 
need not be tightly integrated into the family core business, and the necessary adjustment 
that the foreign subsidiaries have to make to the local economic institutions is less likely 
to disrupt its strategic focus or core business (Miller & Le Breton-Miller, 2005), 
especially when the economic institutions are less favorable in the host country. 
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In sum, when economic institutions are less developed in the host country, family 
firms will choose acquisition in order to boost their economic identity, although the 
acquisition could also dilute their family identity. This decision can be regarded as a 
compromised decision.  If family firms choose Greenfield investment as their entry 
mode, they are more likely to lose their economic identity because of the 
underdeveloped economic institutional environment.  Further, a Greenfield entry mode 
decision may also threaten the survival of their subsidiaries.  One of the disadvantages of 
being a family firm is limited access to resources compared to non-family firms, the 
underdeveloped economic institutions in the foreign country makes the resource 
constraints more urgent. As Sirmon et al (2008) argue, one important motivation for 
family firms to implement an international strategy is to acquire resources from foreign 
countries, in order to utilize financial resources and survive in the underdeveloped 
economic environment, an acquisition instead of a Greenfield investment is a viable 
entry mode.  
Hypothesis 6a: Economic institutional distance positively moderates the 
relationship between economic identity and Greenfield investment when economic 
institutions are less favorable in the host country than in the home country. 
Hypothesis 6b: Economic institutional distance negatively moderates the 
relationship between family identity and Greenfield investment when economic 
institutions are less favorable in the host country than in the home country. 
Negative Regulatory Institutional Distance (Regulatory Institutions in Host 
Country Are Less Favorable Than Regulatory Institutions in Home Country). When 
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family firms invest in a country with less favorable regulatory institutions, the host 
country regulations create an environment that discourages foreign firm activities.  In 
particular, highly regulated institutional environment often lead to inefficient allocation 
of financial resources to satisfy special interests and can distort or discourage private 
incentives through taxes (Browning, 1976; Levine & Renelt, 1992).  Taxes on certain 
value-creating activities, for example, can cause firms to engage in fewer such activities 
and/or to move to locations where taxation on these activities is more favorable (e.g., 
Ballard, Shoven, & Whalley, 1985; Oates, 1999; Trostel, 1993).  Furthermore, 
regulatory institutions sometimes impose unnecessary costs, are ineffective or 
counterproductive.  When they produce such negative outcomes, they are harmful to a 
country’s economy (Collin, 1998; Hill, 1995).  
Under these circumstances, acquisition becomes an attractive choice for family 
firms when they invest in a foreign country. If a family firm enters into a less favorable 
regulatory institutional environment without the help of the local employees, the 
ignorance or misinterpretation of government regulation may create direct incompliance 
costs as well as indirect costs associated with distorted interpretation and incentives 
(Guthrie, 2006; Tirole, 2003). For example, government regulations such as minimum 
wage and price controls limit MNEs’ flexibility, increase product prices, and increase 
their exposure to unfavorable competition conditions. Similarly, many governments have 
specific requirement on foreign ownership levels, thereby disallowing the use of 
Greenfield investment by foreign firms and limiting the options of MNE managers to 
locate certain business in the country (Hennart, 1989). Although it creates extra costs for 
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foreign firms, such regulations can reduce domestic firms’ exposure to foreign markets 
and innovations and help local firms’ to compete with foreign MNEs by restricting the 
product and service options available to consumers. If the foreign firms do not have a 
good understanding of the host country regulatory institutions, their operations are 
unlikely to perform well in the country. In addition, it is even more critical for family 
firms to enter the market with an acquisition instead of a Greenfield investment for the 
consideration of either economic identity or family identity. Family firms intend to use 
internal financial sources and have limited liquidity thereof. The foreign investment is 
more risky when regulatory institutions are less favorable in the host country than in the 
home country. Therefore, family firms are more likely to choose acquisition as their 
entry mode to reduce their resource commitment and protect their economic identity.  
At the same time, the desire to preserve family identity and SEW also encourages 
family firms to use acquisition as their entry mode. In order to maintain family control 
and family influence, certain proportion of top managers in family firms are selected 
from family members. The assets of top managers tend to be less valuable in a foreign 
country because of their lack of foreign operation experience. The unfavorable 
regulatory environment demands more experiences and the unstable and unpredictable 
local environment make the knowledge spillover from local employees more valuable 
and urgent. As a result, acquisition is a viable mode of entry to maintain economic 
identity, and even family identity because without external legitimacy, the survival of 
the subsidiary is threatened while the survival of the firm is the necessary condition to 
preserve the family identity. Therefore,  
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Hypothesis 7a: Regulatory institutional distance positively moderates the 
relationship between economic identity and Greenfield investment when regulatory 
institutions are less favorable in the host country than in the home country. 
Hypothesis 7b: Regulatory institutional distance negatively moderates the 
relationship between family identity and Greenfield investment when regulatory 
institutions are less favorable in the host country than in the home country. 
Negative Political Institutional Distance (Political Institutions in Host Country 
Are Less Favorable Than Political Institutions in Home Country). When the political 
institutions are less favorable in the host country, acquisition will be more beneficial 
than Greenfield investment for market entry.  Local employees with superior local 
knowledge and local connections can help foreign subsidiaries reduce unfamiliarity with 
the local political environment and enhance their local legitimacy. Also, local employees 
provide the opportunity to establish harmonious relationships with local government 
officials (Luo, 2001) and influence officials’ decisions thereby receiving fair or even 
preferential treatment (Boddewyn, 1988; Hillman & Hitt, 1999).  
Although previous research find that experience gained in specific settings such 
as previous international experiences minimizes the deterring influence of institutional 
voids and political hazards on entry modes (Delios & Henisz, 2000), international 
experience, however, does not diminish the negative influence of institutional voids and 
political hazards when the political institutions are less favorable in the host country 
(Henisz & Delios, 2000).  One possible solution to institutional voids and political 
hazards is to detect and safeguard against opportunistic behavior of the host country 
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government by building relationships with partners, buyers, suppliers, and competitors 
that may have an influence on a host country government (Henisz & Williamson, 1999; 
Henisz, 2000). Even the family firms anticipate the opportunistic behavior of the host 
country government before the investment, acquisition is a better choice as such learning 
can be less costly by choosing acquisition as their mode of entry because the learning 
from their local employees is more effective and efficient. In addition, acquisition also 
help to preserve family identity and SEW in parent firms if the foreign subsidiary have 
to make necessary adjustment to obtain the local legitimacy. The use of acquisition as 
their mode of entry is less likely to disrupt its strategic focus or core business in parent 
firms (Miller & Le Breton-Miller, 2005), especially when the political institutions are 
less favorable in the host country. In addition, since family owners cannot sell much 
ownership without losing control of the firm, a primary option family firms may choose 
is to diversify the investment risk by international diversification. Acquisition is a 
critical way family firms may consider, especially when family firms intend to avoid the 
possible negative impact in their core business in their home country. 
Hypothesis 8a: Political institutional distance positively moderates the 
relationship between economic identity and Greenfield investment when political 
institutions are less favorable in the host country than in the home country. 
Hypothesis 8b: political institutional distance positively moderates the 
relationship between family identity and Greenfield investment when political 
institutions are less favorable in the host country than in the home country. 
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METHODS 
Sample 
The family dataset is compiled from the Orbis database, which contains 
information on over 19 million public and private companies from 105 countries, 
including most of the countries in the world. Orbis is not a historical database and strives 
for recent information.  Financial data for companies within Orbis is retained for a 
rolling period of 4 years.  When a new year of data is added, the oldest year is dropped.  
So the dataset provides us with the data from the period of 2009-2012.  The family firm 
is identified using two criteria.  First, following standard criteria used in previous 
research, I identify a firm as a family firm if family members own or control at least 20 
percent of the voting stock (La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes & Shleifer, 1999).  I use 20 
percent ownership as the cutoff for two reasons.3  First, the 20 percent benchmark is 
consistent with the basic of control concept in the governance research on ownership 
structure, especially for European countries (La Porta et al., 1999) and has been widely 
used in the family business literature (see review by Miller et al., 2007).  Second, 20 
percent ownership is also an indicator of controlling and managing the company,4 such 
as the presence on the board of directors or even the majority of the board especially for 
the large companies (La Porta et al., 1999).   
                                                 
3 I have rerun the analysis using thresholds of 10 percent as La Porta et al did (1999) and compare the changes in the 
hypothesized effects. I also used the type of ownership identified by Orbis database to differentiate the family and 
non-family firms, and analyze the data as a robustness test.  The firms with one or more known individuals or families, 
the firms which are owned by employees, managers, or directors are considered as family firms. 
4 Although the 20 percent ownership is used as a cutoff to differentiate family firms and non-family firms, it is only 
used to select the sample.  The family identity is measured by the exact family ownership. 
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I use the Holmes et al. (2013) institutional dataset to obtain data on a country’s 
country level institutions. Holmes et al.’s (2013) institutional dataset includes extensive 
institutional data on 50 countries/geographic areas for the period of 1995-2004. I 
updated the dataset and increase the sample to 113 countries/geographic areas from 
1995-2012. Holmes et al. (2013) obtained the data from various sources including 
Euromonitor International, Index of Economic Freedom (IEF), Freedom House’s annual 
survey of political rights and civil liberties, the Political Constraint Index (POLCON) 
Dataset (Henisz, 2000), International Country Risk Guide (ICRG), Political Risk 
Services, World Bank’s World, Development Indicators (WDI) and the Global 
Leadership and Organizational Behavior Effectiveness (GLOBE) project (House, 
Hanges, Javidan, Dorfman, & Gupta, 2004). 
I also use the Zephyr database to differentiate acquisition and Greenfield 
investments.  Zephry includes financial summaries and structures on companies involved 
in the M&A deals. The data include the parent firms in 113 countries and their 
subsidiaries (both acquisition and Greenfield investments) all over the world from 2007-
2012. I only focused on the completed M&A deals. 
I also use the World Development Indicators database for some country level 
control variables, such as GDP, GDP per capita, and inward and outward FDI.  The 
World Development Indicators database includes the primary World Bank collection of 
development indicators. It is compiled from officially-recognized international sources. 
It provides the most current global development data. After combining these four 
datasets, the final sample includes 2,595 family firms from 70 countries invested in 
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38,014 subsidiaries from 89 countries for the period of 2007-2013 (Table 4). This dataset 
provides comparatively large variances in country institutions and a representative 
sample. 
Measures 
Dependent variable.  I use a dummy variable to measure the mode of entry for 
the subsidiaries (1=greenfield investment; 0=acquisition).  The dependent variable is 
measured with several steps.  First, I retrieved the ownership data from Orbis and 
excluded the subsidiaries which are joint ventures.  Then I matched the parent ID with 
the parent ID I obtained from Zephyr to ensure the sample firms are included in both 
databases.  Then, the mode of entry was coded as 0 if the investment is included in 
Zephyr M&A database, and 1 if it is not.  
Economic identity/Financial performance.  Financial performance is measured 
by ROA. I followed the behavioral agency model in constructing this variable. The 
behavioral agency model suggests performance relative to a reference point affects risk 
preferences (Wiseman & Gomez-Mejia, 1998; Gomez-Mejia, Welbourne & Wiseman, 
2000). Thus, the financial performance is current performance compared with the last 
years’ performance (Chen, 2008).  
Family identity/Socioemotional Wealth.  Although the prior research has used a 
dummy variable to differentiate family firms from non-family firms, in this study I use a 
more fine-grained measure to capture SEW which is a reflection of family identity. This 
is also a company level variable. SEW is measured by the family ownership in the firms 
as a continuous variable.  Family ownership has been widely used to measure SEW and 
 64 
 
family identity in the previous literature (Berrone, et al., 2010).  The family ownership 
includes all shares held by family representatives.  Other studies may use additional 
measure of family control-such as the CEO being a member of the family, number of top 
managers being family members, or the presence of family members on the board of 
directors or board chair (Anderson & Reeb, 2003). However, these measures are usually 
highly correlated with the percentage of ownership held by family.  I chose family 
ownership as the measure of family firm because it is a widely used measure in family 
firm literature (McEachern, 1975, 1976; Salancik & Pfeffer, 1974; Dyl, 1988, 1989; Tosi 
& Gomez-Mejia, 1989; Werner, Tosi & Gomez-Mejia, 2005; Miller, et al., 2007).  
Additionally, the continuous measure give us a better understanding of the conflict 
between family identity and economic identity because the identities coexist and the 
continuous measure vividly illustrates the process of strengthening one identity and the 
weakening of another identity. The value gained by using discreet variables would also 
be substantially reduced compared to the continuous measure. 
Regulatory institutions.  Regulatory institutions establish rules and standards and 
enforce laws and policies that govern business activities.  This is a country level 
variable.  Following Holmes et al. (2013), seven items are used to represent regulatory 
institutions, including regulatory burden, trade policy, contract and property rights, 
foreign investments restrictions, government intervention in banking, monetary policy, 
and informal market (Holmes, et al., 2013).  
Political institutions.  Political institutions reflects the possibility and easiness of 
government officials and other individuals enacting changes in institutions, including 
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political constraints (reverse coded), executive political restrictions (reverse coded), civil 
liberties, and political rights (Holmes, et al., 2013).  High scores on the four items of 
political institutions represent more democratic political systems and low scores 
represent more autocratic systems.  This is also a country level variable. 
Economic institutions.  Economic institutions affect the capital investment 
decisions of individuals and organizations by determining both their accessibility to 
capital and its value.  Capital investments, money supply, total foreign debt, nominal 
GDP, trade balance, debt service, and budget balance reflect the availability of capital in 
an economy and are used to measure capital availability.  
The second type of economic institutions, market liquidity, is measured by the 
credit transfer, net reserves, and liquidity.  Through increasing national debt and 
declining liquidity, the value of the country’s currency is diminished as evidenced by a 
rising exchange rate.  Both of the economic institutions are country level variable 
(Holmes et al, 2013). 
A number of data sets are used as sources of formal institutions in Holmes et al. 
(2013), such as Euromonitor International, Index of Economic Freedom (IEF; Gwartney, 
Lawson, & Block, 1996), Freedom House’s annual survey of political rights and civil 
liberties, the Political Risk Services (PRS), and the World Bank’s World Development 
Indicators (WDI).  The data time period is from 1995 to 2003. The principle components 
analysis supported four factor results.  The four factors are regulatory control, political 
democracy, capital availability, and market liquidity.  Capital availability and market 
liquidity are considered as two components of economic institutions.  
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Following Holmes et al. (2013) work, I updated their data to 2012.  Table 5 
shows the results of the confirmatory factor analysis of the four-factor solution. The 
results showed that the four constructs were stable in the composition and magnitude of 
factor scores.  Therefore, the four constructs are a good representation of the individual 
items, and the constructs relate well to the three types of institutions predicted by the 
theory. 
To accurately test the institutional distance, I utilize spline method in my data 
analysis. The spline method is a useful tool in testing theories that suggest a continuous 
relationship changes slopes at critical thresholds (Greene, 2002; Marsh & Cormier, 
2002). The spline method helps identify differences in a construct above and below the 
threshold level (Greve, 1998, 2003; Sirmon & Hitt, 2009). In this study, I examine mode 
of entry choice when economic, regulatory, and political institutional distance above and 
below 0. Instead of splitting the sample and modeling various subsamples individually, 
which would disrupt the continuity of the function, the spline method allows continuous 
relationships to meet and change slopes at theoretically determined threshold points 
(Greene, 2002; Marsh & Cormier, 2002). In this study, the threshold point is 
theoretically determined to be no institutional distance (Audia & Greve, 2006). More 
specifically, the spline method splits a single institutional distance into two separate 
distances, allowing one to model the positive institutional distance, while the other 
models the negative institutional distance. 
 Control variables.  At the firm level, I control for the possible effects of both 
parents’ and subsidiaries’ attributes.  Parent firm size was measured as logged assets, 
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including all assets in their subsidiaries.   I also control for public/private companies by 
a dummy variable. The variable is coded 1 if the company is listed and 0 otherwise. 
At the country level, following the literature, I measure global connectedness 
using three indicators: international tourism expenditures as a percentage of GDP, 
international tourism receipts as a percentage of GDP, and the percentage of Internet 
users in the population (Berry et al., 2010).  I use GDP per capita to measure the 
average economic growth.  The literature has predicted a positive relationship between 
the level of economic development and FDI activities, so I also control for inward FDI 
and outward FDI.  Because the inward FDI and outward FDI are highly correlated, I 
only control for the inward FDI for the host countries and outward FDI for the home 
countries, considering they are more likely to influence the family firms’ foreign 
investment. I log the variables to correct for skewness.  I also include 4 dummy variables 
to control year effects. Additionally, I control for geographic distance between home 
and host country because trade between two countries is inversely related to geographic 
distance (Anderson, 1979; Deadorff, 1998).  The calculation of geographic distance 
follows the great circle method.  It is the shortest distance between two countries, the 
capitals of two countries specifically. 
Analysis 
I use restricted penalized quasi likelihood model of hierarchical linear modeling 
(HLM) because it can model nested data (Raudenbush et al., 2004).  In particular, HLM 
enables us to simultaneously explore different level relationships while correcting for the 
standard errors at each level.  HLM takes into account the lack of independence among 
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firms within the same country institutional environment by partitioning and modeling 
variance into between-country and within-country variance.  The traditional ordinary 
least squares (OLS) analytic technique does not take the dependency into account. The 
underestimation of standard errors in OLS regression inflates Type I error which means 
we are more likely reject the null hypothesis that there is no relationship between two 
variables when there is no relationship between these two variables (false positive).  
The resultant multilevel model addresses and accounts for the fact that each 
foreign subsidiary is nested within a family firm and that family firm is nested in home-
host country dyads.  The aggregated statistical figures of the subsidiaries were not 
separate conceptually or empirically and had cross-level influences on one another 
(Lindsley et al., 1995). The family firms involved the same home and host country are 
treated as same level 3 cluster.   
Because the dependent variables are dichotomous, I use multilevel logistic 
regression.  I model the impact of regulatory, political, and economic institutional 
distance on family firm entry strategies with three associated submodels.  At each level, 
I model relations at that level as well as residual variability at that level.  In its simplest 
form, the model is as follows5: 
Level-1 model: Entry strategies ijk = π0jk+ eijk 
   Level-2 model: π0jk= β00k+V0jk 
   Level-3 models: β00k = γ000 + γ00k Regulatory Institutional distance00k +U00k 
                                                 
5 Control variables are eliminated for the simplification reason. 
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                           Or β00k = γ000 + γ00k Political Institutional distance00k +U00k  
                           Or β00k = γ000 + γ00k Economic Institutional distance00k +U00k 
Where γ 000 = the average intercept; 
      β00k , γ 00k = The average slope/regression coefficient; 
      V (U00k) = Between-country variance; V(e0jk) = Within-country variance; 
V(eijk) = Within-country within-company variance. 
In these analyses, I examine outcomes for i-th subsidiary nested within j-th MNE 
which is nested in k-th home-host country dyad.  The level-1 coefficients are represented 
by π0jk.  These become an outcome variable in the level-2 model, where β00k are the 
level-2 coefficients.  The level-2 coefficients become an outcome variable in the level-3 
model, where γ000 and γ00k are the level-3 intercept and coefficients. 
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RESULTS 
Descriptive Statistics and Regression Results 
Table 6 provides the correlations and descriptive statistics for the variables 
included in this study.   
Table 7 shows the results of hierarchical linear models estimating the effects of 
family ownership and family financial performance on mode of entry choices, and the 
moderating effects of economic, regulatory, and political institutional distances on the 
two main relationships.   
Hypothesis 1 predicted that there is a negative relationship between economic 
identity and the choice of Greenfield investment as the mode of entry.  As Model 2 
shows, there is a negative and statistically significant relationship between the log odds 
ratio of financial performance and choosing Greenfield investment as the mode of entry 
(β=-0.00, p<0.05).  Transforming the log odds ratio to the odds, for a one-unit increase 
in ROA, I expect to see about 0.004% decrease in the odds of choosing Greenfield 
investment.  Thus, Hypothesis 1 receives support.   
Hypothesis 2 suggested that there is a positive relationship between family 
identity and the choice of Greenfield investment as the mode of entry.  As Model 2 
shows, there is a positive and statistically significant relationship between the log odds 
ratio of family ownership and Greenfield investment (β=0.03, p<0.001).  Converting the 
log odds ratio to the odds ratio, for a one-unit increase in family ownership, we expect to 
see about 0.02% increase in the odds of choosing a Greenfield investment.  These results 
provide support for Hypothesis 2.   
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Hypothesis 3a and 3b suggested that economic institutional distance 
negatively/positively moderates the relationship between economic identity/family 
identity and Greenfield entry mode when economic institutions are more favorable in the 
host country than in the home country.  As Model 3 shows, there is a negative but not 
statistically significant relationship between the log odds ratio of the interaction of 
financial performance and positive economic institutional distance and the Greenfield 
investment (β=-0.00, n.s), thereby providing no support for Hypothesis 3a. Model 4 
shows that there is a negative and statistically significant relationship between the log 
odds ratio of the interaction of family ownership and positive economic institutional 
distance and the Greenfield investment (β=-0.00, p<0.05).  To enrich our understanding, 
I convert the log odds ratio to the odds ratio which shows one unit change in the 
interaction term decreases the odds ratio of the use of Greenfield investment by 0.003; 
this means family firms are less likely to use Greenfield investment when economic 
institutions are favorable in the host country, thereby providing no support for 
Hypothesis 3b. 
Hypothesis 4a and 4b suggested that regulatory institutional distance 
negatively/positively moderates the relationship between economic identity/family 
identity and Greenfield entry mode when regulatory institutions are more favorable in 
the host country than in the home country.  As Model 5 shows, there is a positive but not 
statistically significant relationship between the log odds ratio of the interaction of 
financial performance and positive regulatory institutional distance and the Greenfield 
investment (β=0.01, n.s.), thereby providing no support for Hypothesis 4a. Model 6 
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shows that there is a negative but not statistically significant relationship between the log 
odds ratio of the interaction of family ownership and positive regulatory institutional 
distance and the Greenfield investment (β=-0.01, n.s.); thereby providing no support for 
Hypothesis 4b. 
Hypothesis 5a and 5b suggested that political institutional distance 
negatively/positively moderates the relationship between economic identity/family 
identity and Greenfield entry mode when political institutions are more favorable in the 
host country than in the home country.  As Model 7 shows, there is a negative and 
statistically significant relationship between the log odds ratio of the interaction of 
financial performance and positive regulatory institutional distance and the Greenfield 
investment (β=-0.02, p<0.01). The result suggests that one unit change in the interaction 
term increases the odds of the use of Greenfield investment by 0.047; this means family 
firms are more likely to use Greenfield investment, thereby providing support for 
Hypothesis 5a. Model 8 shows that there is a positive and statistically significant 
relationship between the log odds ratio of the interaction of family ownership and 
positive regulatory institutional distance and the Greenfield investment (β=0.03, 
p<0.001). The result suggests that one unit change in the interaction term increases the 
odds of the use of Greenfield investment by 0.034; this means family firms are more 
likely to use Greenfield investment, thereby providing support for Hypothesis 5b.  
Hypothesis 6a and 6b suggested that economic institutional distance 
positively/negatively moderates the relationship between economic identity/family 
identity and Greenfield entry mode when economic institutions are less favorable in the 
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host country than in the home country.  As Model 9 shows, there is a positive but not 
statistically significant relationship between the log odds ratio of the interaction of 
financial performance and negative economic institutional distance and the Greenfield 
investment (β=0.00, n.s.), thereby providing no support for Hypothesis 6a. Model 10 
shows that there is a positive but not statistically significant relationship between the log 
odds ratio of the interaction of family ownership and negative economic institutional 
distance and the Greenfield (β=0.00, n.s.), thereby providing no support for Hypothesis 
6b. 
Hypothesis 7a and 7b suggested that regulatory institutional distance 
positively/negatively moderates the relationship between economic identity/family 
identity and Greenfield entry mode when regulatory institutions are less favorable in the 
host country than in the home country.  As Model 11 shows, there is a positive and 
statistically significant relationship between the log odds ratio of the interaction of 
financial performance and negative regulatory institutional distance and the Greenfield 
investment (β=0.03, p<.001). The result suggests that one unit change in the interaction 
term increases the odds of the use of Greenfield investment by 0.031; this means family 
firms are more likely to use Greenfield investment, thereby providing support for 
Hypothesis 7a. Model 12 shows that there is a negative and statistically significant 
relationship between the log odds ratio of the interaction of family ownership and 
positive regulatory institutional distance and the Greenfield investment (β=-0.01, 
p<0.01); thereby providing support for Hypothesis 7b. The result suggests that one unit 
 74 
 
change in the interaction term decreases the odds of the use of Greenfield investment by 
0.01; this means family firms are less likely to use Greenfield investment. 
Hypothesis 8a and 8b suggested that political institutional distance 
negatively/positively moderates the relationship between economic identity/family 
identity and Greenfield entry mode when political institutions are less favorable in the 
host country than in the home country.  As Model 13 shows, there is a positive yet not 
statistically significant relationship between the log odds ratio of the interaction of 
financial performance and positive regulatory institutional distance and the Greenfield 
investment (β=0.02, n.s.), thereby not providing support for Hypothesis 8a. Model 14 
shows that there is a positive and statistically significant relationship between the log 
odds ratio of the interaction of family ownership and positive regulatory institutional 
distance and the Greenfield investment (β=0.01, p<0.01). The result suggests that one 
unit change in the interaction term increases the odds of the use of Greenfield investment 
by 0.01; this means family firms are more likely to use Greenfield investment, thereby 
providing support for Hypothesis 8b.   
In sum, Hypothesis 1, 2, 3b, 5b, 7a, and 8b were supported by the empirical 
results but Hypothesis 3a, 4a, 4b, 5a, 6a, 6b, 7b, and 8a did not receive support (Table 7). 
Robustness Tests 
Family firm definition. I identified a firm as a family firm if family members own 
or control at least 20 percent of the voting stock, following La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes 
and Shleifer (1999). Many studies also use other cutoff points, such as 5 percent and 10 
percent (Anderson & Reeb, 2003; Gomez-Mejia, Larraza-Kintana, & Makri, 2003; 
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Villalonga & Amit, 2006). Five percent ownership is used to define family firms for 
publicly traded American firms because the ownership of these firms is highly 
diversified and 5 percent ownership gives the families enough voting power to control 
the firms. Although my sample consists of both public and private firms, 51 percent of 
them are public firms. Considering the large amount of public firms in the sample, I used 
5 percent and 10 percent as cutoffs for the purpose of robustness checks. The 5 percent 
and 10 percent cutoffs provide more observations and therefore provide more power for 
the analysis and most of the relationships remain the same (Table 8 and Table 9). 
Specifically, the signs and statistical significance have not changed for all the 
statistically significant results when I used 10 percent as the cutoff compared to the 
sample using 20 percent as the threshold point. The moderating effect of positive 
economic distance between financial performance and the odds ratio of Greenfield 
investment (Hypothesis 3a) becomes statistically significant (β=-0.10, p<0.10). The 
moderating effect of negative economic distance between financial performance and the 
odds ratio of Greenfield investment (Hypothesis 3b) also becomes statistically 
significant (β=-0.10, p<0.01).  
In addition, the signs and statistical significance have not changed for all the 
statistically significant results when I use 5 percent as the cutoff compared to the sample 
using 20 percent as the cutoff. The moderating effect of positive economic distance 
between financial performance and the odds ratio of Greenfield investment (Hypothesis 
3a) becomes statistically significant (β=-0.00, p<0.05). The moderating effect of 
negative economic distance between financial performance and the odds ratio of 
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Greenfield investment (Hypothesis 3b) is also statistically significant (β=-0.00, p<0.05). 
The moderating effect of positive regulatory distance between financial performance and 
the odds ratio of Greenfield investment (Hypothesis 4a) also becomes statistically 
significant (β=0.02, p<0.05). Then, the moderating effect of positive regulatory distance 
between family ownership and the odds ratio of Greenfield investment (Hypothesis 4b) 
also becomes statistically significant (β=0.12, p<0.05). 
The greater number of hypothesized relationships that are supported may due to 
the increased sample size and statistical power when the less conservative criteria for 
family ownership are used to select the sample of family firms. Thus, the original 
approach used appears to provide a conservative estimate. 
Financial performance compared to industry average. I used current financial 
performance compared to the previous year’s performance as a reference point to predict 
family firms’ risk taking behavior (Cyert & March, 1963), especially the choice of 
Greenfield investment as an entry mode when economic identity is considered to be the 
family’s primary identity. Previous literature also suggests that industry median 
performance (Chen, 2008) or the performance of comparable companies (Cyert & 
March, 1963) can also considered as reference points. For example, Chen (2008) finds 
that firms will increase R&D expenditure if their performance is above past performance 
levels, but firms will decrease R&D expenditure if their performance is above the 
industry median. Considering the possible contradictory conclusion based on different 
reference points, I also analyze the data using industry median performance as a 
reference point (Table 10). The direction and statistical significance of the results only 
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slightly changed. For example, the moderating effect of negative economic distance 
between financial performance and the odds ratio of Greenfield investment (Hypothesis 
3b) become marginally statistically significant (β=0.00, p<0.10).  
The overall institutional distance effect. The concept of institutional 
polycentricity denotes spontaneous interactions of multiple institutional rules and norms, 
and mutual adjustments among institutional actors (Batjargal, et al., 2013). The 
polycentric nature of institutions suggests that firms will carefully examine the whole 
institutional system before they invest in a certain country. The investment decision is 
the tradeoff between the benefits and the costs of operating in the institutional system. 
Therefore, I also tested the effects of overall institutional distance on the mode of entry 
choice.   
I first performed a principle components analysis to extract the single 
institutional distance variable.  The economic, regulatory, and political institutional 
distance loaded on one institutional distance variable (factor loadings are 0.88, 0.92, and 
0.75, respectively). Then, I analyzed the model using the single institutional distance 
variable as moderator.  As Table 11 shows, when the overall institutional distance is 
positive, family firms are less likely to use Greenfield investment as their entry mode if 
their primary goal is to protect their financial performance (β=-0.016, p<.05).  On the 
contrary, when the overall institutional distance is negative, family firms are more likely 
to use Greenfield investment as their entry mode if their primary goal is to protect their 
financial performance (β=0.010, p<0.10). When the overall institutional distance is 
positive, family firms are expected to  use Greenfield investment as their entry mode if 
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their primary goal is to preserve their family ownership, but the result is not statistically 
significant (β=-0.004, n.s.).  On the contrary, when the overall institutional distance is 
negative, family firms are less likely to use Greenfield investment as their entry mode if 
their primary goal is to preserve their family ownership (β=-0.013, p<0.001).  Again, the 
results provide additional support for the basic theoretical logic I proposed in the theory 
section. 
Sample selection bias. Beside the wholly owned subsidiary, there are some other 
non-wholly owned subsidiary modes of entry, such as joint venture, exporting, and 
licensing. The family firms which use the wholly owned subsidiary as their mode of 
entry may self select to choose such type of mode of entry. In order to rule out the 
possibility of sample selection bias, I modeled the impact of financial performance and 
ownership of family firms on mode of entry choice using two two-stage Heckman 
(1979) models.  The first Heckman model tests the self selection of family firms that 
invest domestically or globally. In stage one of Heckman model, the dependent variable 
equals one if the MNE have a foreign subsidiary, and zero otherwise.  Then, the first 
stage Heckman model generates the first inverse Mills ratio, which captures strategy 
self-selection from stage one.  In stage two of Heckman model, the dependent variable 
equals one if the MNE chose a Greenfield investment and zero if it chose an acquisition. 
In this model, I include the first inverse Mills ratio, which is a proxy for strategy self-
selection from the foreign investment decision.  
Model 1 and Model 2 in Table 12 shows the results of Heckman models 
estimating the effects of financial performance and ownership of family firms on foreign 
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entry decisions, using the Heckman’s selection procedure.  The results suggest that 
family firms do self select themselves to invest to foreign countries. The higher financial 
performance leads to lower possibility of investing to a foreign country (inverse mill’s 
ratio=0.002, p<0.001), which provides the empirical support for the prediction that 
family firms are less likely to implement an international strategy when their financial 
performance is high (Gomez-Mejia, et al., 2010).  
The second Heckman model tests the self selection of family firms to use wholly 
owned subsidiary or joint venture. In stage one of Heckman model, the dependent 
variable equals one if the MNE chose wholly owned subsidiary, and zero otherwise.  
Then, the first stage Heckman model generates the first inverse Mills ratio, which 
captures strategy self selection from stage one.  In stage two of Heckman model, the 
dependent variable equals one if the MNE chose a Greenfield investment and zero if it 
chose an acquisition. In this model, I include the first inverse Mills ratio, which is a 
proxy for strategy self selection from the wholly owned subsidiary/joint venture 
decision.  
Model 3 and Model 4 in Table 12 shows the results of Heckman models 
estimating the effects of financial performance and ownership of family firms on wholly 
owned subsidiary/joint venture decision, using the Heckman’s selection procedure.  The 
results suggest that family firms self select themselves to use wholly owned subsidiaries. 
The higher financial performance leads to higher possibility of using wholly owned 
subsidiaries as their mode of entry (inverse mill’s ratio=-0.07, p<0.05), which provides 
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the empirical support for the prediction that family firms are more likely to use a wholly 
owned subsidiary when their financial performance is high.  
The influence of cultural distance. Prior studies suggest that cultural distance may 
affect mode of entry choice (Kogut & Singh, 1988). I did not control for cultural 
distance between the home and host countries in the main data analysis because the 
inclusion of cultural distance will significantly reduce the sample size and sample 
variance from 90 countries to 57 countries, if I used country culture scores obtained from 
the Global Leadership and Organizational Behavior Effectiveness (GLOBE) project 
(House, Hanges, Javidan, Dorfman, & Gupta, 2004). The Hofstede’s (1980) cultural 
distance measure may cause even more sample reduction because it only covers cultural 
data from 46 countries. However, cultural distance is still one of the most influential 
factors to firms’ international strategy (Holmes, et al., 2013). I further tested the models 
with a subsample as a robustness test, including cultural distance as a control variable.  
Unlike the institutional distance which shows clear direction of the distance, 
cultural distance is not directional. Measurement of cultural distance was calculated 
through an adaptation of Kogut and Singh’s (1988) cultural distance index.  The formula 
to measure institutional distance is 
𝑪𝑫𝒋 =∑{(𝑰𝒊𝒋−𝑰𝒊𝒖)
𝟐/𝑽𝒊}/𝒏
𝒏
𝒊=𝟏
 
Where Iij is the index of the ith cultural dimension of each culture category and 
jth home country (such as assertiveness, institutional collectivism, in-group collectivism, 
future orientation, gender egalitarianism, humane orientation, performance orientation, 
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power distance, and uncertainty avoidance), Iiu is the index of the ith cultural dimension 
of each culture category in uth host country, Vi is the variance of index of the ith cultural 
dimension of each culture category, and CDj is the cultural distance of the jth country 
from the host country.   
Table 13 shows that although culture distance significantly increases the probability 
of a family firm to use a Greenfield investment as its mode of entry, it has little influence 
on the hypothesized relationships. The only change is the moderating effect of negative 
political distance between family ownership and the likelihood of choosing a Greenfield 
investment as mode of entry. The relationship changed from statistically significant to 
nonsignificant. 
All in all, I tested the robustness of the primary results by using different measures 
of variables (the different cut-off of ownership and different measure of financial 
performance), by aggregating effect of variables (institutions), by testing the sample 
selection bias, and by including more control variable (cultural distance). The consistent 
findings suggest that the primary results are robust and sample selection bias is not a 
concern in this study. 
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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
Based on organizational identity theory, institutional theory, and research on 
international strategy and socioemotional wealth, I proposed that identity conflicts (the 
conflicts between economic identity and family identity) in family firms influence 
family firms’ international strategies. Additionally, the institutional environments in host 
countries moderate those relationships.  
There are two conflicting findings regarding the international strategies of family 
firms. On the one hand, the behavioral agency model suggests that to preserve 
socioemotional wealth, loss-averse family firms usually invest less internationally than 
nonfamily firms (Gomez-Mejia, et al., 2010). Other scholars believe that international 
diversification has become a critical way to protect family wealth (Kachaner et al., 
2012). I reconcile the conflicting conclusions by integrating insights from the 
organizational identity theory, institutional theory, and mode of entry research.  I 
propose that whether family firms are able to achieve the economic benefits from 
internationalization as well as to preserve their family identity is partly dependent on the 
priority they give to economic identity versus family identity. The institutional distance 
between home and host countries also plays an important role (moderator) in the mode 
of entry choice. 
Based on these theoretical underpinnings, a model is developed proposing that 
the mode of entry choice can reduce the risk of loss of family identity. Specifically, 
family firms are more likely to choose Greenfield investment as their mode of entry into 
a foreign country, if their primary identity is family identity. Family firms are less likely 
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to choose Greenfield investment to enter into a foreign country if they try to protect their 
economic identity. In addition, the distance for three formal institutions--economic, 
regulatory, and political—can either create extra costs or mitigate the liability of 
foreignness, thus encourage or discourage family firms to choose Greenfield investment 
as their entry mode. 
This research makes a number of contributions to our understanding of 
organizational identity, family firms, and institutional theory. First, I focus on the family 
firm internationalization strategy, and determine under what circumstances the two 
dominant identities (economic identity and family identity) of a family firm converge 
and under which they diverge when the reference points are changed. The emphasis on 
family identity in family firms constrains family firms’ mode of entry choice under some 
circumstances. The convergence and divergence of organizational identities contribute to 
the organizational identity theory because it partly solve the long time debate regarding 
the changability of organizational identity. When Albert and Whetten (1985) first 
introduced the organizational identity theory, they summarized attributes of 
organizational identity as central, distinctive, and enduring. Based on these three 
attributes, they argued that organizational identity is unchangeable. The attempt to 
change the organizational identity often creates psychological and social costs. Because 
individuals have the needs for stability and also because organizational identity partly 
determines individuals’ social identification, the organizational identity change 
“confuses—and often angers—internal and external constituencies” (Hannan, Baron, 
Hus, & Kocak, 2006: 756). Additionally, organizational identity serves as the center of 
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the organizations’ strategic focus. Often structural inertia prevents the change of identity. 
The organization identity is also embedded in the organizational practices. The change 
of organizational identity “raise[s] fundamental questions about the nature of the 
organization” (Hannan & Freeman, 1984: 156). Therefore, Albert and Whetten (1985) 
argue that organizational identity is nonchangeable. 
However, we do witness changes in organizational identity. Other scholars argue 
that organizations have multiple identities and organizational identity changes over time 
(Gersick, 1991; Romanelli & Tushman, 1994). Organizations could substitute the old 
identity with the new identity or add a new identity to the old identity. Organizational 
identity is more likely to change in a dynamic environment than in a stable environment 
because the environment changes often require organizations to change their identity 
accordingly in order to be synchronized with the environment and thus to achieve 
legitimacy.  
This study contributes to organizational identity theory by showing the 
possibility of possessing more than one identity in a changing environment—investment 
in a foreign country. Even if family firms consider preserving the family identity as their 
primary goal, they may change their goals in a foreign environment, depending on the 
expectation and constraints of the local institutional environment. The addition of 
economic identity to the family identity or even substitution of family identity with 
economic identity shows that organizations may have multiple identities and identities 
change in a dynamic environment. 
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Second, this study contributes to the current institutional distance-mode of entry 
research by introducing the institutional polycentricity concept. The effect of individual 
institutional distance on mode of entry choice has been widely examined in the previous 
institutional distance literature (e.g. Xu & Shenkar, 2002; Yiu & Makino, 2002). 
However, the institutional environment is a complex and configured system (Batjargal, 
et al., 2013), and the different types of institutions independently and mutually adjust 
with each other (Polanyi, 1951). In this study I mainly focus on three types of formal 
institutions: economic, regulatory, and political institutions. Each type of institution each 
plays an important role in a society by setting up the expectations and rules for social 
behaviors. More importantly, the three types of institutions are co-evolving, co-existing, 
and integrating. Thus, I contribute to the institutional distance literature by pointing out 
that mode of entry choice of a family firm is the result of the evaluation of the integrated 
institutional environment, not each individual institution. 
Relatedly, this study also contributes to the institutional polycentricity concept by 
examining the two level of institutions and their interactions. In addition to the country 
level institutions (economic, regulatory, and political institutions), the organizational 
identities also regulate organizational behaviors and can be considered as organizational 
level institutions. By definition, organizational level institutions provide “rules of 
games” inside the organizations. They determine the internal learning and socialization 
process in the organizational search for identity. Organizational level institutions also 
influence identity construction through collective sense making. Finally, the conformity 
to organizational level institutions and identity creates internal legitimacy. Therefore, 
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organizational identity of family firms cultivates different internal culture, norms and 
institutions that provide support to either family identity or economic identity (or both), 
thus organizational identity constitutes a set of organizational level institutions. In family 
firms, family identity has been developed as a prototype (Gersick, 1991; Romeanelli & 
Tushman, 1994; Ward, 1987). The behavioral conformity to family identity not only 
improves firms’ legitimacy, but also constrains the firms’ decision making. 
The conflict between family and economic identities demonstrates the 
organizational level polycentricity. The preference to family or economic identities 
generates contradictions in norms, culture, policies and routines for three reasons. First, 
the organizational identity is an influential in how family firms will appropriate firm 
assets. The preference to preserve family identity may encourage the top managers to 
appropriate firm assets for personal or family use or to ensure that the use of those 
resources supports or at least does no harm to that identity (Morck et al., 2005; Morck & 
Yeung, 2003). Some of the time, the decisions based on family needs can harm financial 
performance of the firm. Second, family firms are intended to be risk averse in order to 
protect their family names and family reputation (Le Breton-Miller et al., 2011; Schulze 
et al., 2001). The risk preference prevents family firms from objectively evaluating a 
potential investment when risks are involved. Again, the risk-averse alternative preferred 
over a promising investment is likely to be negatively related to financial performance 
(Henkel, 2009). For example, family firms are less apt to invest in innovation and new 
capabilities creation (Bertrand & Schoar, 2006; Bloom & Van Reenen, 2007; Gomez-
Mejia et al., 2010). The inadequate investment in innovation and new capabilities 
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creation constrains family firms to the use of novel knowledge and capability 
exploration which may increase the short-term financial performance, but is more likely 
to harm long-term financial performance (March, 1991; Uotila, et al., 2009). Therefore, 
the identity conflicts between family and economic identities suggest that family firms 
are facing the issues related to the challenges of organizational level polycentricity 
(multiple institutions with conflicting requirements) and the preference for family or 
economic identities has a major influence on the decision making behaviors of family 
firms.  
What makes the situation more challenging is the simultaneous consideration of 
organizational level institutional polycentricity (the tradeoff between family and 
economic identity) and country level institutional polycentricity (the co-evolving and 
mutual adjustment of economic, regulatory, and political institutions) when making 
decisions about which strategy to use (foreign investment decision) and/or decisions 
about how to implement chosen strategies (mode of entry choice). The moderating 
effects show that organizational and country level institutions integratively influence 
family firms’ foreign investment decisions. Thus, I contribute to the current 
polycentricity literature by examining the simultaneous effects of organizational and 
country level institutional polycentricity. 
This study also contributes to our understanding of the effects of institutional 
distance by examining the three dimensions of institutional distance: type, magnitude, 
and direction of institutional distance. Previous literature has focused primarily on the 
influence of absolute institutional distance on internationalization (Xu & Shenkar, 2002; 
 88 
 
Xu et al., 2004).  For example, Xu et al. (2004) suggest that greater regulative and 
normative distances are associated with a lower level of equity ownership, while Gaur 
and Lu (2007) show that in institutional distant countries, subsidiaries have higher 
survival rates if foreign parents have greater ownership. However, the basic assumption 
beneath these findings is that institutional distance is symmetric. However, in reality, 
institutional distance is asymmetric. For example, US formal institutions are stronger 
than in China.  While the absolute formal institutional distance between the United 
States and China is the same, the costs and liability of foreignness associated with a 
Chinese MNE investing in the United States (moving from a weak to a strong 
institutional environment) should differ from those associated with a US MNE investing 
in China (moving from a strong to a weak institutional environment). Thus, the 
consideration of the directional institutional distance in this study contributes to the 
institutional distance literature.  
In the section that follows, I discuss each hypothesis, related findings and 
implications. I then discuss the implications of the study, outline its limitations, and offer 
suggestions for future research. 
Specific Hypotheses and Contributions 
One of the major contributions of this study is to show how identity conflicts 
influence the international strategies of family firms. First, I hypothesize that family 
firms are more likely to choose M&A as their mode of entry if they consider the gains or 
losses of economic identity as their primary reference point. The hypothesis is strongly 
supported by the empirical results. The prior literature finds that firms financially prefer 
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acquisitions because they do not increase the market capacity, they minimize the 
resource commitment, and they reduce exit costs (Kim & Hwang, 1992). This study 
extends our knowledge on this point to a special research setting: family firms. The 
research background of family firm adds special value to the current literature because 
family firms are unusually constrained by internal financial sources and limited liquidity 
(e.g. Anderson & Reeb, 2003; Demsetz & Lehn, 1985; Faccio, Lang, & Young, 2001; 
Shleiffer & Vishny, 1986, 1997). However, because family firms cannot sell many 
shares without losing controls, acquisition is a primary means for family firms to 
diversify their investment risk than Greenfield investment, considering the limited 
liquidity of the family firms. The choice of acquisition as their mode of entry helps 
family firms to spread the risks and reduce volatility of earnings (Faccio, et al., 2001). 
On the contrary, if family firms prefer to protect their family identity and 
socioemotional wealth, they are more likely to choose Greenfield investment as their 
mode of entry as Hypothesis 2 predicted. The empirical results also support this 
hypothesis thereby contributing to the family firm literature by reconciling two 
conflicting findings regarding family firm international strategies. Kachaner and his 
associates argue that family firms can boost their family reputation and extend family 
sustainability by investing overseas (Kachaner et al., 2012). However, other scholars 
believe that family firms will lose their family control and dilute family identity if they 
decide to implement international strategies because of the requirement of more external 
funding, the lack of international experience of family members, and the recruitment of 
outside managerial talent (Gomez-Mejia, Makri & Kintana, 2010). Hence, family firms 
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show lower levels of international diversification than nonfamily firms. The statistically 
significant relationship between family ownership and the use of Greenfield investment 
suggests that family firms can protect their family control as well as extend family 
sustainability and family reputation by choosing an appropriate mode of entry--
Greenfield investment.  
In addition to the above two hypotheses, the robustness test of sample selection 
bias shows a more complete picture of risk preferences of family firms when they 
engage in international strategies (Table 3). The primary conclusion of the behavioral 
agency model is that risk preferences of an individual change with the reference point 
(Wiseman & Gomez-Mejia, 1998; Gomez-Mejia, Welbourne & Wiseman, 2000). The 
concept of loss aversion indicates that individuals will take risks when confronting the 
prospect of a loss and will avoid risks when confronting the prospect of a gain (Tversky 
& Kahneman, 1986). The sample selection bias tests provide full support for behavioral 
agency model. When both the financial performance and family ownership are low, 
family firms are more willing to take risk and choose a joint venture as their mode of 
entry. When family identity is high but economic identity is low (i.e., family identity is 
primary), family firms are more risk averse and more likely to choose Greenfield 
investment as their mode of entry. When economic identity is high but family identity is 
low (i.e., economic identity is primary), family firms are more financially risk averse and 
choose acquisition as their mode of entry. Finally, when both family and economic 
identities are high, family firms will prefer conservative actions and they will not engage 
in international strategies.  
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Bromiley (2010) and Holmes et al. (2011) criticize the behavioral agency model 
by pointing out that behavioral agency researchers only focus on single decisions, not 
the logic of mixed gambles, even though the mixed gambles exemplify most 
management decisions. Thus, the sample select bias tests contribute to the behavioral 
agency model in two ways: (1) the models empirically test the situation when two 
dimensions (the gains and losses of economic identity and family identity) are involved 
in a decision; (2) the models include the mixed gambles related to four scenarios: high 
economic identity-high family identity; low economic identity-low family identity; high 
economic identity-low family identity; and low economic identity-high family identity.  
Hypothesis 3a and 3b predict the effects of favorable economic institutions on 
the two main relationships between family and economic identities and the likelihood of 
choosing Greenfield investment as mode of entry.  The results show that there is no 
observable preference regarding the mode of entry choice when family firms consider 
economic identity as their primary reference point in a favorable economic institutional 
environment while family firms are less likely to choose Greenfield investment as their 
mode of entry when they pay more attention to the preservation of family identity and 
invest in a country with more favorable economic institutions.  
Similarly, Hypothesis 6a and 6b predict the effects of less favorable economic 
institutions on the two main relationships between family and economic identities and 
the likelihood of choosing Greenfield investment as mode of entry.  The results show 
that there is no observable preference regarding the mode of entry choice when family 
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firms consider either economic identity or family identity as their primary reference 
point and enter into a less favorable economic institutional environment. 
A possible explanation for the four unsupported hypotheses is that family firms 
are less likely to use external sources of financial capital compared to nonfamily firms 
(e.g. Anderson & Reeb, 2003; Demsetz & Lehn, 1985; Faccio, Lang, & Young, 2001; 
Shleiffer & Vishny, 1986, 1997). The external monetary and fiscal policies have less 
influence on family firms’ mode of entry decisions. The statistics from McKinsey’s 
corporate performance analysis tool (CPAT) lends support for the findings. The data 
from CPAT shows that the average yield spread on corporate bonds is 32 percent lower 
for family firms than non-family firms (Caspar, Dias, & Elstrodt, 2010). The internal 
capitals are the major financial source in family firms. 
Hypothesis 4a and 4b predict the effects of favorable regulatory institutions on 
the two main relationships between family and economic identities and the likelihood of 
choosing Greenfield investment as mode of entry.  The results show that there is no 
observable preference regarding the mode of entry choice when family firms consider 
either economic or family identity as their primary reference point in a favorable 
regulatory institutional environment.  
Hypothesis 7a and 7b predict the effects of less favorable regulatory institutions 
on the two main relationships between family and economic identities and the likelihood 
of choosing Greenfield investment as mode of entry.  The results show that family firms 
are less likely to choose Greenfield investment when they consider economic identity as 
their primary reference point in a less favorable regulatory institutional environment. 
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Alternatively, family firms are less likely to choose Greenfield investment when they try 
to preserve their family identity in a less favorable regulatory environment, providing 
support for both Hypothesis 7a and 7b.  
The non-observable preferences in the favorable regulatory environment suggests 
that the favorable regulatory environment gives family firms more freedom when they 
make the foreign investment decisions in such way that it lowers the liability of 
foreignness and reduce transaction costs. Family firms can achieve their financial goals 
even though they choose Greenfield investment or preserve their family identity even if 
they choose acquisition. 
Hypotheses 5a and 5b hypothesize the effects of favorable political institutions 
on the two main relationships between family and economic identities and the likelihood 
of choosing Greenfield investment as mode of entry.  The empirical results show that 
family firms are less likely to choose Greenfield investment when they consider 
economic identity as their primary reference point in a more favorable political 
institutional environment. At the same time, family firms are more likely to choose 
Greenfield investment when they try to preserve their family identity in a more favorable 
political environment, providing support for both Hypothesis 5a and 5b. 
Hypothesis 8a and 8b predict the effects of less favorable regulatory institutions 
on the two main relationships between family and economic identities and the likelihood 
of choosing Greenfield investment as mode of entry.  The results show that there is no 
obvious mode of entry preference when family firms consider economic identity as their 
primary reference point in a less favorable political institutional environment. Similarly, 
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family firms are more willing to use Greenfield investment as their entry mode when 
they try to preserve their family identity in a less favorable political environment, 
providing support to Hypothesis 8b, but providing no support to Hypothesis 8a.  
A potential explanation to the observed non-preference in a more autocratic 
political environment when economic identity is the primary identity in a family firm is 
that autocratic institutions represent the countries with less limited governments, 
governments are less open to competition, especially in some autocratic countries where 
governments believe central planning is better than competition, and firms in the 
environment have less political rights. The autocratic governments have more influence 
on property rights and firm performance (Djankov, S., La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, & 
Shleifer, 2002). Therefore, an alliance with the state and local government is a more 
viable option for MNEs in autocratic countries (Li & Resnick, 2003), if economic 
identity is the primary identity for family firms.  
Comparing the effects of the three types of formal institutions, some institutions 
are more impactful in the less favorable institutional environment, such as regulatory 
institutions, while other institutions are more influential of family firms’ international 
strategy in a favorable institutional environment, such as economic institutions. Political 
institutions have a significant influence in both favorable and less favorable 
environments. Duran, Heugens, and Kostova (2013) categorize institutions into 
constraining institutions and enabling institutions. Constraining institutions are all 
“constitutions, statutes, regulations, norms, enforcement, and sanctions” that constrain 
and direct human decision makers (Eggertsson, 1996: 8). Enabling institutions allow 
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human decision makers to acquire the specialized resources needed to initiate and 
sustain entrepreneurial activities and to expand the scope of their action alternatives 
(Carney, 2012). Applying the concept of constraining and enabling institutions to the 
types of formal institutions, economic institutions and favorable regulatory institutions 
can be classified as enabling institutions (or less enabling institutions for less favorable 
economic institutions), these institutions broaden family firms’ mode of entry choice. 
Thus they do not lead to a certain type of mode of entry choice. The political institutions 
and less favorable regulatory institutions, on the other hand, fit the description of 
constraining institutions. The political rules (either democratic or autocratic) and strong 
regulations constrain and direct human decision making, thus strengthen or attenuate a 
certain type of mode of entry choice. This study thus contributes to institutional theory 
by demonstrating the different effects of enabling and constraining institutions on mode 
of entry choice. 
The robustness test using overall institutional distance also contributes to the 
current institutional distance literature. The polycentric nature of institutions suggests 
that firms carefully examine the institutional system as a whole before they invest in a 
certain country. The investment decision is the tradeoff between the benefits and the 
costs of operating in an institutional system. Therefore, the test of the effects of overall 
institutional distance variable on the mode of entry choice is a meaningful supplement to 
the current findings and conclusions.  
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Managerial Implications 
The family firm is a dominant business form in the world (La Porta, et al., 1999). 
One-third of companies in the S&P 500 index and forty percent of the 250 largest 
companies in France and Germany are considered as family business. More importantly, 
family firms have some unique characteristics compared to non-family firms. One of the 
major characteristics of family firms is their dual identities: family identity and 
economic identity. The uniqueness of family firms urges a more careful examination of 
this specific type of business form.  
Family firms possess two identities: economic identity which refers to their 
financial performance orientation and family identity which is accurately defined by the 
preservation of socioemotional wealth. The combination of the two identities is unique 
in practice. Oftentimes, family firms weigh family identity more than economic identity. 
For example, in the mission statement of Mars Inc., it says “As a family-owned company 
for nearly a century, we are guided by our five principles: quality, responsibility, 
mutuality, efficiency and freedom.” The mission statement of Mars clearly shows that 
family identity is more important to family firms than economic identity. Comparatively, 
non-family firms normally pay more attention to their customers which directly lead to 
their profitability. For example, the mission of Advance Auto Parts is to “provide 
personal vehicle owners and enthusiasts with the vehicle related products and knowledge 
that fulfill their wants and needs at the right price. Our friendly, knowledgeable and 
professional staff will help inspire, educate and problem-solve for our customers.” The 
different foci of family and non-family firms show the dual identity of family firms. 
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The emphasis on family identity influences mode of entry choice when family 
firms decide to invest internationally. Besides the financial concerns, such as strategic 
planning, financing, tax implications, operational effectiveness, institutional 
environment, human resource management concerns, technology and infrastructure, the 
international strategy in general and mode of entry choice in specific also embed the 
unique needs of the family. The specific concerns include the lack of international 
experiences of top managers and family members, internal financing planning, longer 
term orientation, and the preservation of family control. Because of the special concerns 
of family firms, they are more likely to choose wholly owned subsidiaries as their mode 
of entry to maintain the family control and transfer the family culture to the foreign 
subsidiaries. 
The local institutional environment is another issue family firms need to consider 
when family firms invest overseas. When family firms home-based in a favorable 
institutional environment invest in a less favorable institutional environment, the local 
institutional environment creates both benefits and costs for the family firms. The market 
potential in the host countries help family firms spread the risks globally and leverage 
the foreign buying power with the saturated domestic markets. The less favorable 
institutional environment may also have weaker property right protection and more 
regulations (reasons for the lower favorability). Thus, mode of entry matters in the 
balancing of the benefits and the costs. A good example is the worldwide operations of 
Wal-Mart. Since 1991, when Wal-Mart started its global expansion, it has built 
thousands of stores in Mexico, Brazil, Argentina, Canada, China, India, and so on. Wal-
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Mart entered several developing countries by acquisition, including Mexico (acquisition 
of Cifra), Chile (acquisition of Distribucion y Servicio D&S S.A.), and South Africa 
(acquisition of Massmart Holding Limited). The mode of entry choice by Wal-Mart 
reflects the consideration of family and economic identities under less favorable 
institutional conditions, partly in line with this study’s predictions. 
Another recent and extreme example is the bribery of Mabey and Johnson, a 
family firm located in UK. In 2009, Mabey and Johnson became the first major British 
company to be convicted of foreign bribery. As a bridge-building company, the 
company had paid bribes to the host country politicians and officials to win contracts in 
Angola, Ghana, Madagascar, Mozambique, Bangladesh, and Jamaica. For those family 
firms that prefer to operate legally, the weak regulatory and political institutions make 
the acquisition more viable for family firms in order to protect their family control and 
property rights. Some scholars even argue that an alliance of the state, local, and 
multinational capital is a more viable option for MNEs in less favorable institutional 
environment (Li & Resnick, 2003). For example, foreign companies that partner with 
Chinese State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) may be able to work in regulated or restricted 
industries, apply for special projects or fundings, and receive preferential treatment or 
policy incentives. Foreign companies that choose to partner with SOEs can also 
minimize risks and operational conflicts caused by under-developed institutional 
environment, such as protecting intellectual property rights. 
On the contrary, when a family firm from a less favorable institutional 
environment invests in a favorable institutional environment, the local institutions 
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provide more freedom in the mode of entry choice. As the empirical results show, the 
family firms from less favorable institutional environment could use different types of 
mode of entry to take full advantage of the favorable institutional environment in the 
host countries. For example, 93 percent of Alibaba’s earnings come from its home 
country operations in China. However, it chose the New York Stock Market for its initial 
public opening and became the largest initial stock sale in US history. The favorable U. 
S. institutional environment is one of the undeniable driving forces that led to Alibaba’s 
initial success with its IPO. Specific to Alibaba’s international strategies in the United 
States, Alibaba used a joint venture as the mode of entry and paid more than $200 
million for a 39 percent stake in Shoprunner, which competes with Amazon Prime. It 
also acquired ride-sharing mobile app Lyft, among others. Additionally, in June, Alibaba 
chose a Greenfield investment as the mode of entry to launch its own U.S. shopping 
website (11Main.com) to test the U.S. online retail market. The freedom of choice for 
Alibaba among different types of mode of entry supports to the efficacy of the empirical 
results of this study suggesting that favorable economic, regulatory, and political 
institutions in the United States provide Alibaba more freedom to choose different 
modes of entry for this market. 
Limitations and Future Research Directions 
Future research should attempt to overcome the limitations of the present study. 
One of the major limitations of this study is the underlying assumption of family 
ownership. In the family firm literature, there are two competing opinions regarding the 
relationship between family ownership and family firms’ efficiency and competencies. 
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Some studies show that when family members have excess control rights, they pay more 
attention to gaining efficiency and to building capabilities and outperform the non-
family firms (Anderson & Reeb, 2003; McConaughy, Matthews, & Fialco, 2001; Simon, 
1996; Villalonga & Amit, 2006). In this context, a family’s control rights and the 
intention to preserve the socioemotional wealth positively influence a firm’s operations 
and the success as well as its long-term survival. Therefore, family members who are 
also the TMT members most of the time are intended to make decisions aligned with the 
firm’s long-term interests. Based on this argument, the basic is that the family ownership 
is positively related to family firms’ financial performance. 
However, other scholars find that after a family has ownership for unchallenged 
control, it will create agency problem. Family members will use their excess control 
rights for their own personal benefit at the expense of non-family shareholders 
(Claessens, et al., 2002). Aligned with this argument, family firms are often viewed as 
the firms that suffer from the lack of professional management (Chandler, 1990), 
destructive nepotism (Schulze, Lubatkin, & Dino, 2001; Schulze, Lubatkin, Dino, & 
Buchholtz, 2003), and exploitation of minority shareholders’ interests (Morck & Yeung, 
2003). In these firms, the primary goal of family firms is not to increase the financial 
performance, but to take resources out of the firm, a process known as tunneling 
(Johnson, La Porta, Lopez-de Silanes, & Schleifer, 2000). Tunneling behavior can cause 
numerous problems in family firms, such as entrenched managers and CEOs (Gomez-
Mejia, Nunez-Nickel, & Gutierrez, 2001), few new product development (Ellington & 
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Deane, 1996), little investment in R&D activities (Chandler, 1990), and a reallocation of 
wealth from stakeholders to the family (Burkart, Panunzi, & Shleifer, 2002). 
Tunneling can cause more serious problems if family firms invest overseas. Family 
members can use cost allocation to pass expenses down to foreign subsidiaries in which 
they have the lowest financial and emotional interests and take advantage of transfer 
pricing to move revenues up to the parent firms in which they have the highest financial 
and emotional interests. Furthermore, because long-term investment can cannibalize 
existing businesses, family firms have less incentives to invest to long-term projects in 
the subsidiary. Applying these research findings to the current study, we could argue that 
family firms are less likely to invest globally as it shows in one of the robustness check 
because foreign investment involves more resource commitment, thus cannibalizing the 
resources the family members take out of the firms. Therefore, future research focusing 
on the negative outcomes of family ownership could add valuable knowledge on the 
potentially different effects of family ownership on family firms’ mode of entry choice.  
Another major limitation is the definition of family firms. Although the 
classification of family firms in this study is based on previous literature (La Porta, et al., 
1999), and I used the more conservative cut-off of 20 percent to determine whether a 
firm should be included in the sample of family firms, other studies have used additional 
indicators of family control-such as the CEO being a member of the controlling family, 
top managers being the family members, or the presence of family members on the 
board of directors or board chair (Anderson & Reeb, 2003). CEOs or directors who are 
also family members are more likely to embed family’s interests in firms’ operations. 
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For the external stakeholders, they are more likely to align the wealth and reputations of 
the families to the success and survival of the firms if CEOs or directors are also family 
members.  Due to data inaccessibility, I was unable to include such variables. Future 
studies that use multiple indicators to select the sample of family firms and focus on 
family control could add valuable knowledge to understanding the family firms’ 
international strategies. Relatedly, the percentage of ownership possessed by the family 
may change constantly. In order to take into consideration of such changes, especially a 
decrease in the level of family ownership, it should be examined periodically. Again, 
due to data inaccessibility, I was not able to examine the family ownership over time. 
Future studies which examine whether the companies identified as family firms in earlier 
years still meet the criteria during the entire period of the study would be more accurate 
in defining family firms and in understanding their effects, especially for those in which 
changes occurred.  
The empirical results of this study could also be biased because of the measure of 
family identity that is presented by socioemotional wealth. Socioemotional wealth is a 
general concept that describes a family’s affective value gained from a firm (Berrone et 
al., 2010; Gomez-Mejia, et al., 2010). It embodies the emphasis on belonging, affect, and 
intimacy (Kepner, 1983), the importance of family values through the business (Handler, 
1990), the fulfillment of family obligations (Athanassiou et al., 2002) and the altruism to 
family members (Schulze et al., 2003), and the attention paid to satisfy the demands of 
external stakeholders, such as local society (Adams, Taschian, & Shore, 1996; Dyer & 
Whetten, 2006), suppliers and customers (Carney, 2005), and employees. Thus, the 
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socioemotional wealth concept is a very broad construct that describes many aspects of 
family firms. Although family ownership has been used as a legitimate proxy for 
socioemotional wealth (Berrone et al., 2010), there are a variety of options to capture the 
different aspects of socioemotional wealth. The possible dimensions of socioemotional 
wealth include family members’ identification with the firm, bonding social ties, 
emotional attachment, preservation of family bonds inside of the firm through dynastic 
succession, etc. (Berrone, Cruz, & Gomez-Mejia, 2012). Although most of the current 
studies have used secondary proxies (e.g., percentage of shares owned by a family) to 
measure socioemotional wealth when using large archival databases, the proxies are 
unlikely to capture the full spectrum of the construct. Different approaches for 
addressing this methodological gap, such as, surveys, content analysis, laboratory 
experiments, and case studies could make meaningful contributions to our understanding 
of socioemotional wealth. 
CEO succession and CEO duality are two widely discussed corporate governance 
problems in family firm literature and may potentially influence family firms’ 
international strategies. The average CEO tenure at family-run businesses ranges 
between 15 and 25 years, while that of the typical public, non-family firms leader now 
three to four years (Le Breton-Miller et al., 2004). Thus, family CEOs usually exhibit 
longer term planning horizons (Miller & Le Breton-Miller, 2005; Miller, Le Breton-
Miller, & Scholnick, 2008; Sirmon & Hitt, 2003). The longer-term view fosters the 
building of the family dynasty, the embeddedness of family values through the business, 
and the preference of passing the business to subsequent generations to foster a 
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“generational investment strategy that creates patient capital” (Sirmon & Hitt, 2003: 
343), commitment to building sustainable capabilities, and learning. Therefore, CEO 
tenure is a potential factor which could influence family firms’ mode of entry choice. 
The future research focusing on this line is promising. 
CEO succession can also influence family firms’ international strategy. When a 
family firm transfers ownership/control to second and later generations, there is the 
potential for major changes in the top management team and strategic orientation in the 
years immediately before or after the succession (Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1996). A bias 
in favor of family candidates may lead to a narrow selection pool and less competent 
successors. The less competent successors can curb valuable investment or make 
mistakes on investment, thus cause the family firms lose family control (Ward, 2004). 
As a major investment decision, international strategies of family firms could be 
significantly influenced by CEO succession, providing a promising research direction for 
future studies. 
In addition, informal institutional distance also affects MNEs’ entry mode choices 
and control of their subsidiaries. As Holmes et al (2013) identified, the country’s 
informal institutions are critical components, along with the formal institutions, of a 
country’s institutional environment. In general, the greater the informal institutional 
distance between home and host countries, the more control firms will need to deal with 
information asymmetries, uncertainty and risks associated with foreign operations (e.g., 
Boyacigiller, 1990; Erramilla & Rao, 1993; Hamilton & Kashlak, 1999; Padmanabhan & 
Cho, 1994; Pan, 1996). Although I included cultural distance as a control variable in one 
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of the robustness tests, the investigation of the interrelationships of formal and informal 
institutional distance and their potential influence on mode of entry choice is a promising 
direction for future research.  
Batjargal and associates (2013) investigated the effect of institutional polycentrism 
on new venture growth.  These scholars proposed the main theoretical postulates of 
institutional polycentrism, namely, institutional multiplicity, institutional configuration, 
and institutional context. Their study suggests that the combination of less-effective 
political, regulatory and economic institutions has a negative effect on the revenue 
growth of new ventures. Yet, structural holes and entrepreneurs’ social network as an 
informal institution positively influenced new venture growth.  The future research 
which focuses on the interrelationship between formal and informal institutional distance 
would extend the work of Batjargal et al (2013) by offering a different form of 
institutional complexity, showing the integrative and potential configurational effects of 
both formal and informal institutions.   
Lastly, the examination of the impact of firm identity as well as country level 
institutions on mode of entry choice can be regarded as the first step in the research. The 
performance implications of entry mode choice should be examined (Brouthers, 
Brouthers, & Werner, 1999; Woodcock, Beamish, & Makino, 1994). Several studies 
have examined performance differences when firms choose wholly owned modes 
(acquisitions or Greenfield investment), or joint ventures as their mode of entry (e.g., 
Nitsch, Beamish, & Makino, 1996; Pan & Chi, 1999; Pan, Li, & Tse, 1999; Shrader, 
2001; Simmonds, 1990; Woodcock et al., 1994). However, Shaver (1998) points out that 
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these studies may suffer from an endogeneity problem, i.e., different entry mode 
performance is compared without considering the characteristics of the investment 
decision. This study only examined how the characteristics of the parent firms and 
institutional environments affect firms’ mode of entry choice; the future research which 
further investigated the consequential financial performance of certain type of mode of 
entry could make contributions to this research area. 
In conclusion, this study has conceptualized the polycentric characteristics of 
institutional distance and demonstrated the importance of institutional integration and 
understanding of the firm level and country level institutional influences on the mode of 
entry choice. From these theoretical underpinnings, a model is developed proposing that 
the mode of entry choice may mitigate the risk of loss of family identity. Specifically, 
family firms are more likely to choose Greenfield investment as their mode of entry to a 
foreign country.  In addition, the distance between home and host countries for three 
formal institutions--economic, regulatory, and political—may create extra costs if family 
firms choose Greenfield investment as their entry mode. The sample including 2,595 
family firms from 70 countries invested in 38,014 subsidiaries from 89 countries for the 
period of 2007-2013 provides support for several of the hypotheses. The theoretical 
models and empirical tests provide a strong catalyst for future research drawing on 
family firm research and institutional theory and using an institutional polycentric lens to 
understand how each international strategy is shaped in a dominant business form: 
family firms.   
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APPENDIX 
 
Table 1: Benefits and costs of internationalization for family firms 
 Economic Identity Family Identity 
Benefits from 
Internationalization 
Disperse the investment 
risk geographically 
Preserve family identity 
by protecting family 
wealth and ensuring firm 
survival 
Costs from 
Internationalization 
Costs caused by liability of 
foreignness 
Dilute family identity by 
bringing in professional 
executives 
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Table 2: The relationship between mode of entry and family firm identities 
Mode of entry Identity 
Acquisition High economic identity, low family identity 
Greenfield investment High family identity, low economic identity 
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Table 3: The application of behavioral agency model to the mode of entry choice 
Family identity is the 
primary identity 
Mode of entry: Greenfield 
Conservative decision 
Mode of entry: No 
international diversification 
Risk taking decision 
Mode of entry: Joint 
Venture 
Economic identity is the 
primary identity 
Mode of entry: Acquisition 
 
 
 
L
o
w
 
H
ig
h
 
F
am
ily
 id
en
tity
 
Economic identity 
Low High 
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Table 4: Subsidiary countries in the sample 
Countries 
United Arab Emirates Germany  Japan Portugal  
Argentina Denmark  Kenya Romania  
Austria Ecuador  Kuwait Russian Federation  
Australia Egypt  Kazakhstan Saudi Arabia  
Barbados Spain  Sri Lanka Sudan  
Bangladesh Finland  Mexico Sweden  
Belgium France  Malaysia Singapore  
Bulgaria United Kingdom  Nigeria 
Syrian Arab 
Republic 
 
Algeria Greece  Netherlands Slovakia  
Bolivia Croatia  Lithuania Thailand  
Brazil Hungary  Norway Tunisia  
Botswana Indonesia  New Zealand Turkey  
Canada Ireland  Oman 
Trinidad And 
Tobago 
 
Switzerland Israel  Panama Taiwan  
Chile India  Peru United States  
China Iraq  Papua New Guinea Uruguay  
Colombia Iran  Philippines Venezuela  
Costa Rica Italy  Pakistan Viet Nam  
Czech Republic Jamaica  Poland South Africa  
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Table 5: Results of Factor Analysis 
 Factor 1: 
Regulatory 
Control 
Factor 2: 
Political 
Democracy 
Factor 3: 
Capital 
Availability 
Factor 4: 
Market 
Liquidity 
Regulatory burden 0.867    
Contract and property rights 0.933    
Trade policy 0.801    
Informal markets 0.885    
Government intervention in banking 0.879    
Foreign investment restrictions 0.884    
Monetary policy 0.633    
Political constraints  0.978   
Political rights  0.961   
Civil liberties  0.966   
Executive political restrictions  0.860   
Money supply   0.637  
Capital investments   0.855  
Total foreign debt   0.913  
Nominal GDP   0.982  
Budget balance   0.963  
Debt service   0.951  
Trade balance   0.872  
Liability   0.718  
Credit transfer    0.660 
Net reserve    0.924 
Liquidity    0.789 
Total proportion of variance explained 0.714 0.888 0.755 0.637 
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Table 6: Means, standard deviations, and correlations 
  Mean SD 1 2 3 5 6 7 8 9 11 12 13 14 15 16 
1 Greenfield 0.97 0.18 1.00              
2 Firm size 14.50 2.87 0.04 1.00             
3 Listed 0.51 0.50 -0.03 0.06 1.00            
4 Geo distance 6.91 1.71 0.02 -0.02 -0.01 1.00           
5 Host inward FDI -0.23 0.84 0.01 -0.01 0.02 -0.06 1.00          
6 Host GDP 1.85 2.91 -0.02 -0.06 0.01 0.30 -0.17 1.00         
7 Host GDP per capita 1.15 1.12 -0.05 -0.17 -0.11 -0.12 0.00 0.21 1.00        
8 Home outward FDI 0.05 0.60 -0.02 -0.07 -0.06 -0.13 0.31 -0.04 0.04 1.00       
9 GDP per capita 1.34 1.05 -0.04 -0.22 -0.09 0.14 -0.01 0.10 0.66 0.18 1.00      
10 Connection 2.28 1.99 -0.02 -0.07 -0.08 0.17 -0.08 0.44 0.20 -0.13 0.24 1.00     
11 ROA 1.35 13.35 -0.01 0.27 0.06 -0.03 0.01 -0.06 -0.12 0.00 -0.13 -0.07 1.00    
12 Family ownership 27.54 26.19 0.08 0.04 -0.42 0.01 0.00 0.03 0.07 0.03 0.02 0.24 0.05 1.00   
13 Economic distance 0.03 1.34 -0.01 -0.02 0.05 0.04 -0.10 0.59 0.22 0.05 -0.02 -0.31 -0.02 -0.06 1.00  
14 Regulatory distance -0.18 0.81 -0.01 0.05 0.01 -0.21 0.05 0.01 0.37 -0.11 -0.20 -0.03 0.00 -0.03 0.28 1.00 
15 Political distance 0.11 0.60 0.01 -0.01 -0.02 0.24 0.12 -0.02 -0.27 -0.01 0.16 0.09 0.01 0.03 -0.13 -0.52 
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Table 7: Hierarchical linear regression results 
 VARIABLES Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
year2 -0.71*** -0.60*** -0.56*** -0.60*** -0.56*** -0.60*** -0.59*** -0.60*** 
 (-10.37) (-6.76) (-6.37) (-6.80) (-6.32) (-6.77) (-6.72) (-6.81) 
year3 0.08 0.26*** 0.29*** 0.28*** 0.33*** 0.25*** 0.26*** 0.25*** 
 (1.25) (3.37) (3.78) (3.65) (4.15) (3.30) (3.45) (3.31) 
year4 -0.24*** -0.19** -0.17* -0.17* -0.13+ -0.19** -0.19** -0.20** 
 (-4.27) (-2.77) (-2.40) (-2.49) (-1.78) (-2.72) (-2.68) (-2.83) 
Firm size 0.06*** 0.03** 0.03** 0.03** 0.03** 0.03** 0.03** 0.03** 
 (10.07) (3.02) (3.06) (3.03) (2.81) (2.87) (2.96) (2.97) 
Listed -0.62*** 0.08 0.03 0.06 0.06 0.09 0.09 0.08 
 (-10.90) (0.90) (0.36) (0.63) (0.65) (0.92) (0.91) (0.90) 
Geographic distance 0.07*** 0.09*** 0.05* 0.13*** 0.07** 0.08*** 0.09*** 0.09*** 
 (4.61) (4.61) (2.01) (5.71) (3.10) (3.79) (4.06) (4.51) 
Host inward FDI 0.04 0.11** 0.11** 0.11** 0.11** 0.11** 0.11** 0.11** 
 (1.26) (2.72) (2.68) (2.75) (2.76) (2.82) (2.71) (2.69) 
Host GDP -0.07 -0.07 -0.12* -0.10+ -0.07 -0.06 -0.07 -0.07 
 (-1.34) (-1.32) (-2.14) (-1.91) (-1.22) (-1.16) (-1.29) (-1.32) 
Host GDP per capita -0.12 -0.07 -0.10 -0.08 -0.10 -0.05 -0.05 -0.06 
 (-1.64) (-0.92) (-1.33) (-1.18) (-1.33) (-0.62) (-0.63) (-0.89) 
Home outward FDI -0.01 -0.05 -0.06+ -0.05 -0.05 -0.06+ -0.05 -0.05 
 (-0.52) (-1.64) (-1.74) (-1.54) (-1.47) (-1.77) (-1.54) (-1.53) 
Home GDP per capita -0.02 -0.04 -0.03 -0.03 -0.01 -0.05 -0.05 -0.04 
 (-0.62) (-1.05) (-0.73) (-0.67) (-0.34) (-1.33) (-1.32) (-1.09) 
Home connection 0.04*** 0.00 0.06** 0.04* 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (3.67) (0.23) (2.95) (2.26) (0.65) (0.31) (0.23) (0.23) 
Firm performance  -0.00* -0.00+ -0.00+ -0.00* -0.00 -0.00+ -0.00+ 
  (-2.07) (-1.87) (-1.88) (-2.15) (-0.75) (-1.68) (-1.88) 
Family ownership  0.03*** 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.03*** 
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  (20.76) (19.63) (20.35) (20.34) (20.71) (20.72) (20.72) 
Positive economic   0.18***      
distance   (3.92)      
Negative economic    0.17***     
distance    (3.53)     
Positive regulatory     0.28**    
distance     (3.17)    
Negative regulatory      -0.15*   
distance      (-1.99)   
Positive political       0.14  
distance       (1.32)  
Negative political        -0.03 
distance        (-0.19) 
Financial performance×   -0.00      
Positive economic distance   (-0.60)      
Financial performance×    0.00     
Negative economic distance    (0.07)     
Financial performance×     0.01    
Positive regulatory distance     (0.61)    
Financial performance×      0.03***   
Negative regulatory distance      (4.95)   
Financial performance×       -0.02**  
Positive political distance       (-2.83)  
Financial performance×        0.02 
Negative political distance        (1.22) 
Constant 3.18*** 1.63*** 1.91*** 1.43*** 1.77*** 1.68*** 1.65*** 1.62*** 
 (17.18) (6.55) (7.35) (5.60) (6.99) (6.69) (6.58) (6.47) 
chi2 468.3 702.7 718.8 714.2 710.4 732.1 713.2 704.9 
chi2_c 959.8 399.9 413.2 388.3 410.3 399.5 379.0 398.1 
ll -14659 -8921 -8913 -8915 -8915 -8910 -8917 -8920 
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Table 7: Hierarchical linear regression results (Cont.) 
VARIABLES Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 Model 12 Model 13 Model 14 
year2 -0.57*** -0.60*** -0.57*** -0.60*** -0.59*** -0.59*** 
 (-6.39) (-6.77) (-6.40) (-6.82) (-6.69) (0.09) 
year3 0.29*** 0.28*** 0.32*** 0.24** 0.26*** 0.26*** 
 (3.72) (3.68) (4.09) (3.17) (3.33) (0.08) 
year4 -0.17* -0.17* -0.13+ -0.21** -0.20** -0.19** 
 (-2.42) (-2.44) (-1.86) (-2.99) (-2.87) (0.07) 
Firm size 0.03** 0.03** 0.03** 0.03** 0.03** 0.03*** 
 (3.07) (3.03) (2.80) (3.04) (3.09) (0.01) 
Listed 0.04 0.05 0.07 0.08 0.07 0.09 
 (0.40) (0.56) (0.70) (0.89) (0.72) (0.09) 
Geographic distance 0.04+ 0.13*** 0.07** 0.08*** 0.08*** 0.09*** 
 (1.85) (5.73) (3.04) (3.94) (3.72) (0.02) 
Host inward FDI 0.11** 0.11** 0.11** 0.11** 0.10** 0.11** 
 (2.67) (2.75) (2.73) (2.75) (2.60) (0.04) 
Host GDP -0.12* -0.10+ -0.07 -0.07 -0.06 -0.07 
 (-2.12) (-1.91) (-1.23) (-1.24) (-1.15) (0.05) 
Host GDP per capita -0.10 -0.08 -0.10 -0.05 -0.04 -0.07 
 (-1.37) (-1.17) (-1.35) (-0.65) (-0.47) (0.07) 
Home outward FDI -0.05+ -0.05 -0.05 -0.06+ -0.05 -0.05 
 (-1.71) (-1.53) (-1.42) (-1.74) (-1.64) (0.03) 
Home GDP per capita -0.03 -0.03 -0.01 -0.05 -0.06 -0.04 
 (-0.72) (-0.68) (-0.30) (-1.37) (-1.41) (0.04) 
Home connection 0.06** 0.04* 0.01 0.00 -0.00 0.00 
 (3.01) (2.29) (0.68) (0.07) (-0.05) (0.01) 
Firm performance -0.00* -0.00* -0.00* -0.00* -0.00* 0.00* 
 (-2.21) (-2.01) (-2.08) (-2.04) (-1.97) (0.00) 
Family ownership 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.03*** 
 (19.10) (19.44) (19.68) (18.78) (19.28) (0.00) 
Positive economic  0.22***      
distance (4.46)      
Negative economic   0.15**     
distance  (2.87)     
Positive regulatory    0.36**    
distance   (3.19)    
Negative regulatory     0.01   
distance    (0.12)   
Positive political     -0.05  
distance     (-0.46)  
Negative political      -0.18 
distance      (0.17) 
Family ownership× -0.00*      
Positive economic distance (-2.34)      
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Family ownership×  0.00     
Negative economic distance  (0.91)     
Family ownership×   -0.00    
Positive regulatory distance   (-1.12)    
Family ownership×    -0.01**   
Negative regulatory distance    (-2.72)   
Family ownership×     0.03***  
Positive political distance     (4.98)  
Family ownership×      0.01** 
Negative political distance      (0.01) 
Constant 2.71*** 2.23*** 2.58*** 2.50*** 2.51*** 2.43*** 
 (10.89) (9.02) (10.60) (10.34) (10.42) (0.24) 
chi2 725.1 715.2 715.9 700.9 703.7 707.22 
chi2_c 413.7 386.6 408.4 396.6 382.6 399.17 
ll -8910 -8914 -8915 -8916 -8903 -8917 
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Table 8: Hierarchical linear regression results (10% cutoff)  
 VARIABLES Model1 Model2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
year2 -0.71*** -0.63*** -0.61*** -0.63*** -0.59*** -0.63*** -0.63*** -0.63*** 
 (-10.37) (-9.29) (-8.95) (-9.29) (-8.72) (-9.30) (-9.28) (-9.34) 
year3 0.08 0.31*** 0.33*** 0.30*** 0.37*** 0.30*** 0.31*** 0.31*** 
 (1.25) (4.96) (5.32) (4.87) (5.83) (4.88) (4.98) (4.93) 
year4 -0.24*** -0.21*** -0.20*** -0.21*** -0.15** -0.21*** -0.21*** -0.21*** 
 (-4.27) (-3.82) (-3.62) (-3.84) (-2.65) (-3.83) (-3.80) (-3.84) 
Firm size 0.06*** 0.07*** 0.07*** 0.07*** 0.07*** 0.07*** 0.07*** 0.07*** 
 (10.07) (10.54) (10.58) (10.50) (10.01) (10.49) (10.53) (10.48) 
Listed -0.62*** 0.06 0.02 0.06 0.04 0.06 0.06 0.06 
 (-10.90) (0.72) (0.28) (0.78) (0.47) (0.72) (0.72) (0.68) 
Geographic distance 0.07*** 0.06*** 0.01 0.05** 0.03* 0.05*** 0.05*** 0.05*** 
 (4.61) (4.22) (0.51) (3.28) (2.18) (3.55) (3.73) (3.76) 
Host inward FDI 0.04 0.11** 0.11** 0.11** 0.11*** 0.11** 0.11** 0.11** 
 (1.26) (3.23) (3.21) (3.24) (3.32) (3.26) (3.19) (3.25) 
Host GDP -0.07 -0.06 -0.09+ -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 -0.06 
 (-1.34) (-1.04) (-1.71) (-0.95) (-0.88) (-0.90) (-1.03) (-1.04) 
Host GDP per capita -0.12 -0.17** -0.21** -0.17* -0.21** -0.16* -0.16* -0.18** 
 (-1.64) (-2.59) (-3.08) (-2.57) (-3.07) (-2.34) (-2.37) (-2.65) 
Home outward FDI -0.01 -0.05* -0.06* -0.05* -0.05+ -0.05* -0.05+ -0.05* 
 (-0.52) (-1.98) (-2.22) (-2.01) (-1.88) (-2.01) (-1.87) (-2.04) 
Home GDP per capita -0.02 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.02 
 (-0.62) (0.43) (0.88) (0.37) (1.54) (0.07) (0.12) (0.65) 
Home connection 0.04*** 0.01 0.06*** 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
 (3.67) (0.59) (4.31) (0.11) (1.02) (0.60) (0.57) (0.75) 
Firm performance  -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.01*** 
  (-5.29) (-4.82) (-5.48) (-5.59) (-4.09) (-5.01) (-5.12) 
Family ownership  0.03*** 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.03*** 
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  (29.27) (27.92) (29.03) (28.79) (29.23) (29.26) (29.25) 
Positive economic    0.17***      
distance   (5.44)      
Negative economic     -0.01     
distance    (-0.47)     
Positive regulatory      0.28***    
distance     (3.92)    
Negative regulatory       -0.10+   
distance      (-1.67)   
Positive political       0.08  
distance       (1.02)  
Negative political        -0.17 
distance        (-1.25) 
Financial performance×   -0.00      
Positive economic distance   (-0.47)      
Financial performance ×    -0.00     
Negative economic distance    (-1.58)     
Financial performance ×     0.02*    
Positive regulatory distance     (2.40)    
Financial performance ×      0.01**   
Negative regulatory distance      (3.14)   
Financial performance ×       -0.01  
Positive political distance       (-1.26)  
Financial performance ×        0.02 
Negative political distance        (1.36) 
Constant 3.18*** 1.39*** 1.66*** 1.39*** 1.52*** 1.38*** 1.38*** 1.40*** 
 (17.18) (6.89) (7.97) (6.68) (7.42) (6.87) (6.85) (6.90) 
chi2 468.3 1488 1513 1489 1503 1502 1491 1490 
chi2_c 959.8 833.4 857.4 831.7 849.8 817.9 789.1 833.8 
ll -14659 -14751 -14736 -14750 -14740 -14746 -14750 -14750 
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Table 8: Hierarchical linear regression results (10% cutoff, Cont.)  
 VARIABLES Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 Model 12 Model 13 Model 14 
year2 -0.61*** -0.63*** -0.59*** -0.63*** -0.62*** -0.62*** 
 (-8.96) (-9.29) (-8.71) (-9.28) (-9.20) (-9.24) 
year3 0.33*** 0.30*** 0.37*** 0.30*** 0.31*** 0.31*** 
 (5.31) (4.90) (5.82) (4.91) (5.05) (5.02) 
year4 -0.20*** -0.21*** -0.15** -0.21*** -0.20*** -0.20*** 
 (-3.63) (-3.83) (-2.67) (-3.87) (-3.74) (-3.74) 
Firm size 0.07*** 0.07*** 0.07*** 0.07*** 0.07*** 0.07*** 
 (10.59) (10.50) (10.05) (10.59) (10.60) (10.52) 
Listed 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.06 0.05 0.06 
 (0.31) (0.51) (0.44) (0.72) (0.65) (0.72) 
Geographic distance 0.01 0.06*** 0.03* 0.05*** 0.05*** 0.05*** 
 (0.49) (3.39) (2.16) (3.59) (3.69) (3.67) 
Host inward FDI 0.11** 0.11** 0.11*** 0.11** 0.11** 0.11** 
 (3.20) (3.23) (3.30) (3.26) (3.16) (3.27) 
Host GDP -0.09+ -0.06 -0.05 -0.05 -0.06 -0.06 
 (-1.71) (-1.02) (-0.88) (-0.96) (-1.03) (-1.02) 
Host GDP per capita -0.21** -0.18** -0.21** -0.16* -0.15* -0.18** 
 (-3.09) (-2.67) (-3.04) (-2.32) (-2.27) (-2.67) 
Home outward FDI -0.06* -0.05* -0.05+ -0.05* -0.05+ -0.05* 
 (-2.20) (-1.99) (-1.83) (-2.07) (-1.93) (-2.09) 
Home GDP per capita 0.03 0.01 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.02 
 (0.86) (0.43) (1.43) (0.00) (0.09) (0.73) 
Home connection 0.06*** 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
 (4.36) (0.33) (1.04) (0.60) (0.59) (0.79) 
Firm performance -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.01*** 
 (-5.42) (-5.32) (-5.24) (-5.29) (-5.26) (-5.30) 
Family ownership 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.03*** 
 (26.17) (28.02) (27.13) (27.29) (28.09) (29.25) 
Positive economic  0.17***      
distance (5.47)      
Negative economic   0.01     
distance  (0.29)     
Positive regulatory    0.28***    
distance   (3.89)    
Negative regulatory     -0.07   
distance    (-1.17)   
Positive political     0.11  
distance     (1.31)  
Negative political      -0.19 
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distance      (-1.46) 
Family ownership× -0.00      
Positive economic distance (-0.73)      
Family ownership×  0.00**     
Negative economic distance  (3.14)     
Family ownership×   0.00    
Positive regulatory distance   (0.24)    
Family ownership×    -0.00   
Negative regulatory distance    (-0.99)   
Family ownership×     0.01**  
Positive political distance     (2.78)  
Family ownership×      0.01* 
Negative political distance      (2.37) 
Constant 2.44*** 2.21*** 2.31*** 2.17*** 2.17*** 2.19*** 
 (12.11) (10.89) (11.65) (11.158) (11.10) (11.17) 
chi2 1517 1495 1498 1488 1485 1494 
chi2_c 856.5 819.7 848.8 818.8 792.8 834.4 
ll -14736 -14747 -14743 -14750 -14746 -14749 
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Table 9: Hierarchical linear regression results (5% cutoff)  
 VARIABLES Model1 Model2 Model3 Model4 Model5 Model6 Model7 Model8 
year2 -0.78*** -0.64*** -0.61*** -0.64*** -0.62*** -0.64*** -0.64*** -0.64*** 
 (-15.10) (-10.87) (-10.45) (-10.84) (-10.43) (-10.87) (-10.87) (-10.84) 
year3 0.06 0.29*** 0.31*** 0.28*** 0.32*** 0.28*** 0.29*** 0.29*** 
 (1.27) (5.23) (5.61) (5.09) (5.56) (5.10) (5.25) (5.25) 
year4 -0.37*** -0.18*** -0.16*** -0.19*** -0.16** -0.19*** -0.18*** -0.18*** 
 (-8.68) (-3.84) (-3.43) (-3.95) (-3.23) (-3.91) (-3.85) (-3.81) 
Firm size 0.04*** 0.06*** 0.06*** 0.06*** 0.06*** 0.06*** 0.06*** 0.06*** 
 (9.80) (11.04) (11.24) (10.91) (10.73) (11.19) (11.06) (11.04) 
Listed -0.85*** 0.07 0.04 0.08 0.06 0.07 0.07 0.07 
 (-16.42) (0.90) (0.53) (1.02) (0.76) (0.94) (0.90) (0.88) 
Geographic distance 0.04*** 0.06*** 0.02 0.05*** 0.05*** 0.05*** 0.06*** 0.06*** 
 (3.54) (5.29) (1.59) (3.32) (4.01) (4.21) (4.88) (5.02) 
Host inward FDI 0.06* 0.12*** 0.12*** 0.12*** 0.12*** 0.12*** 0.12*** 0.12*** 
 (2.47) (3.99) (4.07) (4.02) (4.05) (4.04) (3.93) (4.00) 
Host GDP -0.03 0.01 -0.02 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 
 (-0.49) (0.12) (-0.30) (0.34) (0.23) (0.33) (0.09) (0.13) 
Host GDP per capita -0.11+ -0.08 -0.10 -0.08 -0.09 -0.05 -0.07 -0.08 
 (-1.71) (-1.15) (-1.50) (-1.12) (-1.36) (-0.74) (-1.03) (-1.16) 
Home outward FDI 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.00 
 (0.07) (0.02) (-0.40) (-0.05) (0.03) (-0.09) (0.09) (-0.02) 
Home GDP per capita -0.04 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.04 -0.00 0.02 0.03 
 (-1.62) (0.95) (1.32) (0.76) (1.49) (-0.11) (0.64) (0.99) 
Home connection -0.02** -0.00 0.04*** -0.01 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
 (-2.77) (-0.35) (3.64) (-1.40) (-0.26) (-0.21) (-0.38) (-0.33) 
Firm performance  -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.01*** 
  (-8.48) (-7.23) (-8.59) (-8.74) (-7.51) (-8.57) (-8.51) 
Family ownership  0.02*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 
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  (31.48) (30.18) (31.30) (31.16) (31.51) (31.48) (31.46) 
Positive economic    0.13***      
distance   (5.57)      
Negative economic     -0.04     
distance    (-1.51)     
Positive regulatory      0.11+    
distance     (1.79)    
Negative regulatory       -0.16**   
distance      (-3.01)   
Positive political       0.05  
distance       (0.69)  
Negative political        -0.01 
distance        (-0.11) 
Financial performance×   -0.00*      
Positive economic distance   (-2.16)      
Financial performance ×    -0.00*     
Negative economic distance    (-1.97)     
Financial performance ×     0.02**    
Positive regulatory distance     (2.65)    
Financial performance ×      0.01+   
Negative regulatory distance      (1.87)   
Financial performance ×       0.01  
Positive political distance       (1.47)  
Financial performance ×        -0.01 
Negative political distance        (-0.91) 
Constant 3.93*** 1.50*** 1.69*** 1.55*** 1.54*** 1.47*** 1.48*** 1.48*** 
 (25.73) (8.11) (8.91) (8.12) (8.21) (7.98) (8.02) (7.97) 
chi2 896.7 1782 1807 1785 1791 1791 1784 1783 
chi2_c 1971 1093 1117 1090 1099 1063 1024 1093 
ll -26299 -20142 -20124 -20139 -20137 -20137 -20141 -20142 
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Table 9: Hierarchical linear regression results (5% cutoff, Cont.)  
 VARIABLES Model9 Model10 Model1 Model2 Model3 Model4 
year2 -0.62*** -0.64*** -0.62*** -0.64*** -0.63*** -0.64*** 
 (-10.46) (-10.85) (-10.43) (-10.88) (-10.81) (-10.85) 
year3 0.31*** 0.28*** 0.32*** 0.28*** 0.29*** 0.29*** 
 (5.64) (5.09) (5.62) (5.13) (5.32) (5.26) 
year4 -0.16*** -0.19*** -0.15** -0.19*** -0.18*** -0.18*** 
 (-3.44) (-3.97) (-3.15) (-3.93) (-3.75) (-3.83) 
Firm size 0.06*** 0.06*** 0.06*** 0.06*** 0.06*** 0.06*** 
 (11.29) (10.94) (10.84) (11.23) (11.10) (10.99) 
Listed 0.04 0.07 0.05 0.07 0.06 0.07 
 (0.50) (0.82) (0.63) (0.93) (0.82) (0.93) 
Geographic distance 0.02 0.05*** 0.05*** 0.05*** 0.06*** 0.06*** 
 (1.54) (3.41) (4.17) (4.20) (4.80) (4.87) 
Host inward FDI 0.12*** 0.12*** 0.12*** 0.12*** 0.12*** 0.12*** 
 (4.04) (4.01) (4.02) (4.03) (3.95) (3.99) 
Host GDP -0.02 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 
 (-0.36) (0.28) (0.19) (0.30) (0.16) (0.13) 
Host GDP per  -0.10 -0.08 -0.09 -0.05 -0.06 -0.08 
capita (-1.52) (-1.18) (-1.29) (-0.75) (-0.89) (-1.18) 
Home outward FDI -0.01 -0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (-0.37) (-0.00) (0.08) (-0.12) (0.02) (0.02) 
Home GDP per  0.03 0.02 0.03 -0.00 0.02 0.03 
capita (1.31) (0.82) (1.25) (-0.09) (0.65) (1.06) 
Home connection 0.04*** -0.01 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
 (3.67) (-1.21) (-0.20) (-0.24) (-0.38) (-0.21) 
Firm performance -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.01*** 
 (-8.61) (-8.52) (-8.47) (-8.56) (-8.48) (-8.45) 
Family ownership 0.02*** 0.03*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 
 (27.85) (29.98) (28.59) (29.62) (30.23) (31.33) 
Positive economic  0.13***      
distance (5.51)      
Negative economic   -0.01     
distance  (-0.41)     
Positive regulatory    0.12*    
distance   (2.00)    
Negative regulatory     -0.14**   
distance    (-2.76)   
Positive political     0.14+  
distance     (1.73)  
Negative political      -0.06 
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distance      (-0.54) 
Family ownership× -0.00      
Positive economic distance (-0.01)      
Family ownership×  0.00*     
Negative economic 
distance  (2.39)     
Family ownership×   0.01*    
Positive regulatory distance   (2.24)    
Family ownership×    -0.00   
Negative regulatory 
distance    (-0.26)   
Family ownership×     0.01**  
Positive political distance     (2.71)  
Family ownership×      0.01 
Negative political distance      (1.64) 
Constant 2.42*** 2.33*** 2.27*** 2.23*** 2.22*** 2.24*** 
 (13.331) (12.530) (12.583) (12.521) (12.404) (12.501) 
chi2 1806 1786 1776 1786 1782 1786 
chi2_c 1116 1075 1102 1061 1029 1092 
ll -20127 -20138 -20137 -20138 -20138 -20141 
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Table 10: Hierarchical linear regression results (Industry Average) 
 VARIABLES Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
year2 -0.68*** -0.63*** -0.68*** -0.62*** -0.68*** -0.69*** -0.68*** 
 (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) 
year3 0.12* 0.17** 0.14* 0.23*** 0.15* 0.12+ 0.13* 
 (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) 
year4 -0.21*** -0.19*** -0.19*** -0.12* -0.20*** -0.21*** -0.21*** 
 (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) 
Firm size 0.08*** 0.08*** 0.08*** 0.08*** 0.08*** 0.08*** 0.08*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Listed -0.66*** -0.68*** -0.68*** -0.68*** -0.67*** -0.67*** -0.66*** 
 (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) 
Geographic distance 0.08*** -0.00 0.12*** 0.04* 0.11*** 0.11*** 0.07*** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Host inward FDI 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.04 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Host GDP -0.09 -0.17** -0.13* -0.08 -0.11+ -0.10+ -0.09 
 (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) 
Host GDP per capita -0.11 -0.17* -0.13+ -0.16* -0.16* -0.17* -0.12 
 (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) 
Home outward FDI -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.00 0.00 -0.02 -0.02 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Home GDP per capita -0.02 -0.00 -0.00 0.03 0.04 0.05 -0.00 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Home connection 0.03** 0.13*** 0.07*** 0.04*** 0.03** 0.03** 0.03** 
 (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Firm performance 0.00* 0.00 0.00* 0.00+ 0.01** 0.00** 0.00* 
Positive economic  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
distance  0.29***      
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Negative economic   (0.03)      
distance   0.22***     
Positive regulatory    (0.04)     
distance    0.47***    
Negative regulatory     (0.08)    
distance     0.27***   
Positive political     (0.06)   
distance      -0.42***  
Negative political      (0.07)  
distance       -0.23* 
Financial performance×  0.00     (0.107) 
Positive economic distance  (0.00)      
Financial performance ×   0.00+     
Negative economic distance   (0.00)     
Financial performance ×    0.01    
Positive regulatory distance    (0.01)    
Financial performance ×     0.01**   
Negative regulatory distance     (0.00)   
Financial performance ×      -0.02***  
Positive political distance      (0.01)  
Financial performance ×       0.01 
Negative political distance       (0.018) 
Constant  3.31*** 2.68*** 3.10*** 2.85*** 2.83*** 2.95*** 
 0.00* (0.20) (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) (0.190) 
chi2 526.2 595.1 562.9 558.6 558.1 576.2 530.7 
chi2_c 947.6 1008 941.6 984.5 967.3 980.4 950.8 
ll -14407 -14368 -14389 -14385 -14391 -14384 -14404 
 *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1  
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Table 11: Hierarchical linear regression results (Overall institutions)  
VARIABLES Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Year dummy -0.516*** -0.536** -0.428* -0.548** -0.452* 
Year dummy 0.299*** 0.175 0.391* 0.162 0.370* 
Year dummy -0.087 -0.212 0.038 -0.220 0.005 
Firm size -0.015 -0.074*** -0.020 -0.074*** -0.020 
Prior experience 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.002*** 0.001*** 
Listed -0.225* -0.513* -0.292 -0.502* -0.225 
Geographic distance 0.078*** 0.125* 0.063 0.122* 0.056 
Host inward FDI 0.084** -0.093 0.122** -0.094 0.121** 
Host GDP per capita -0.157*** -0.015 -0.120* -0.013 -0.118* 
Home outward FDI 0.013 -0.101 0.070 -0.110 0.076 
Home GDP per capita -0.028 -0.242* -0.035 -0.232* -0.046 
Connection -0.025 -0.127 -0.097 -0.140 -0.099 
ROA -0.004* 0.018+ 0.002 -0.001 -0.004 
Family ownership 0.024*** 0.018*** 0.022*** 0.022*** 0.014*** 
Positive institutional distance  -0.275**  -0.220+  
Negative institutional distance   -0.215+  -0.042 
Financial performance × Positive institutional distance  -0.016*    
Financial performance × Negative institutional distance   0.010+   
Family ownership × Positive institutional distance    -0.004  
Family ownership × Negative institutional distance     -0.013*** 
Constant 2.466*** 3.874*** 2.885*** 4.366*** 3.678*** 
Observations 77,450 15,869 22,145 15,869 22,145 
Chi square 823.9 187.3 205.4 182.1 197.1 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1 
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Table 12: Heckman model regression results  
Variables Mode l Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Dependent Variable Foreign subsidiary Greenfield WOS Greenfield 
Firm size 0.03*** 0.00*** -0.04*** 0.00** 
 (18.71) (3.83) (-28.77) (2.65) 
Listed 0.63*** 0.00 0.30*** -0.01 
 (42.17) (-1.10) (25.96) (-1.02) 
Year 0.10*** 0.00*** -0.06*** 0.00* 
 (20.23) (3.37) (-16.02) (2.27) 
Geographic distance 0.96*** 0.01*** 0.04*** 0.00 
 (198.76) (4.35) (16.94) (0.21) 
Host inward FDI 0.24*** 0.00*** 0.09*** 0.00 
 (38.11) (4.07) (19.30) (-0.77) 
Host GDP per capita -0.17*** -0.01*** -0.01 0.00*** 
 (-26.26) (-10.65) (-1.40) (-5.81) 
Home outward FDI 0.31*** -0.01*** 0.11*** -0.01*** 
 (25.81) (-3.61) (11.55) (-5.24) 
Home GDP per capita 0.49*** 0.00* 0.00 0.00+ 
 (61.67) (-2.46) (-0.02) (-1.88) 
Home connection -0.20*** 0.00** -0.14*** 0.00 
 (-96.31) (-2.76) (-87.15) (1.56) 
Firm performance -0.00*** -0.00* -0.00*** 0.00 
 (-6.94) (-2.40) (-7.60) (0.43) 
Family ownership -0.01*** 0.00*** 0.01*** 0.00* 
 (-46.89) (13.75) (38.78) (2.50) 
Constant -216.24*** -4.18** 126.10 -5.81** 
 (-21.02) (-2.78) (16.04) (-1.96) 
Inverse Mill’s Ratio 0.02***  -0.07*  
 (5.01)  (-1.98)  
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Table 13:Hierarchical linear regression results (with culture control) 
 VARIABLES Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8  
year2 -0.77*** -0.67*** -0.65*** -0.67*** -0.64*** -0.67*** -0.67*** -0.68*** 
 (0.07) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) 
year3 0.11 0.33*** 0.36*** 0.35*** 0.39*** 0.33*** 0.34*** 0.33*** 
 (0.07) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.09) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) 
year4 -0.26*** -0.19** -0.17* -0.17* -0.14+ -0.19* -0.19* -0.20** 
 (0.06) (0.07) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) 
Firm size 0.06*** 0.03** 0.03** 0.03** 0.03** 0.03** 0.03** 0.03** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Listed -0.64*** 0.00 -0.04 -0.02 -0.01 0.00 -0.00 0.00 
 (0.0610) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) 
Geographic distance 0.01 -0.00 -0.03 0.04 -0.01 -0.01 -0.00 0.00 
 (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Host inward FDI 0.03 0.13** 0.13** 0.13** 0.13** 0.13** 0.14** 0.13** 
 (0.03) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
Host GDP -0.06 -0.05 -0.09 -0.08 -0.05 -0.04 -0.05 -0.05 
 (0.06) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.05) 
Host GDP per capita -0.11 -0.07 -0.11 -0.10 -0.11 -0.05 -0.09 -0.07 
 (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) 
Home outward FDI -0.03 -0.12** -0.13** -0.11** -0.11** -0.12** -0.12** -0.11* 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
Home GDP per capita -0.12** -0.09+ -0.06 -0.06 -0.04 -0.10+ -0.06 -0.09+ 
 (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05) 
Home connection 0.05*** 0.01 0.07** 0.05* 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 
 (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Culture 0.16*** 0.19*** 0.16*** 0.19*** 0.15** 0.19*** 0.21*** 0.19*** 
 (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
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Financial performance  -0.01** -0.01** -0.01** -0.01** -0.00+ -0.01** -0.01** 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Family ownership  0.03*** 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.03*** 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Positive economic    0.16**      
distance   (0.05)      
Negative economic     0.16**     
distance    (0.05)     
Positive regulatory      0.26**    
distance     (0.10)    
Negative regulatory       -0.16+   
distance      (0.09)   
Positive political       -0.11  
distance       (0.12)  
Negative political        -0.03 
distance        (0.17) 
Financial performance×   -0.00      
Positive economic distance   (0.00)      
Financial performance ×    -0.00     
Negative economic distance    (0.00)     
Financial performance ×     -0.00    
Positive regulatory distance     (0.01)    
Financial performance ×      0.02***   
Negative regulatory distance      (0.01)   
Financial performance ×       -0.02*  
Positive political distance       (0.01)  
Financial performance ×        0.01 
Negative political distance        (0.01) 
Constant 3.64*** 2.21*** 2.40*** 2.01*** 2.23*** 2.24*** 2.22*** 2.20*** 
 (0.22) (0.30) (0.31) (0.30) (0.30) (0.30) (0.30) (0.30) 
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chi2 486.5 687.5 697.8 694.2 692.8 711.5 697.9 689.3 
chi2_c 850.6 324.5 333.3 310.1 331.5 325.0 324.1 323.4 
ll -12980 -7628 -7623 -7624 -7625 -7619 -7625 -7628 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1 
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Figure 1: Hypothesized model of relationships for family firm identity, institutional 
distance and mode of entry 
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Figure 2: The convergence of family identity and economic identity when formal 
institutions are stronger in host country than in home country 
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Figure 3: The divergence of family identity and economic identity when formal 
institutions are weaker in host country than in home country 
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